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1935 
ORIGINALISM AND THE UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 
Lawrence B. Solum** 
In his book, America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Reed 
Amar contends that to properly engage the written Constitution, 
scholars and laymen alike must look to extratextual sources: among 
them America’s founding documents, institutional practices, and 
ethos, all of which constitute Amar’s “unwritten Constitution.”  In 
this Article, I argue that contemporary originalist constitutional theo-
ry is consistent with reliance on extraconstitutional sources in certain 
circumstances.  I establish a framework for revaluating the use of ex-
tratextual sources.  That framework categorizes extratextual sources 
and explains their relevance to constitutional interpretation (the 
meaning of the text) and constitutional construction (elaboration of 
constitutional doctrine and decision of constitutional cases).  I con-
clude by applying the framework to a question posed by Akhil Amar: 
Can vice presidents preside over their own trial upon impeachment?  
A negative answer to this question is consistent with an originalist 
constitutional theory that carefully cabins the use of extratextual 
sources in constitutional interpretation and construction. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF AN UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
FOR ORIGINALISTS 
In 1975, Thomas Grey asked, “Do we have an unwritten constitu-
tion?”1  His question has been echoed by Michael Moore,2 Antonin Scal-
ia,3 and others.4  Recently, Akhil Amar has provided his own distinctive 
                                                                                                                                      
 *  (c) 2012 by the Author.  Permission is hereby granted to make copies in tangible or electron-
ic form, including but not limited to the distribution of this work in whole or in part for educational or 
scholarly purposes. 
 ** John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975). 
 2. Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 107 
(1989). 
 3. Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1989). 
 4. The literature on unwritten constitutions, unenumerated constitutional rights, the Ninth 
Amendment, and related topics is vast.  Some of the work that influenced the writing of this Article in 
particular include: Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289 (2001); Suzana 
Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); Adrian Vermeule, The 
Facts About Unwritten Constitutionalism: A Response to Professor Rubenfeld, 51 DUKE L.J. 473 
(2001). 
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answer to Grey’s question in America’s Unwritten Constitution.5  One of 
the motivations for Grey’s essay was the early stirrings of originalism; de-
scendants of the interpretivism and textualism that Grey interrogated 
now occupy center stage in contemporary debates about constitutional 
theory.  But since Grey wrote his essay, originalism and textualism have 
evolved.  This Article addresses the idea of an unwritten constitution 
from the perspective of contemporary originalist theory.  Is the notion of 
an unwritten constitution consistent with the originalist claim that consti-
tutional practice should be constrained by the original public meaning of 
the constitutional text? 
We can begin with a preliminary statement of the problem as the 
conjunction of three propositions: (1) The predominate form of contem-
porary originalism is textualist; let’s call this form of originalism “public 
meaning originalism.”  (2) An unwritten constitution is not a text.  (3) 
Therefore, public meaning originalists should reject the notion of an un-
written constitution. 
This simple syllogism6 is misleading, in part because the phrase 
“unwritten Constitution” provides an unfortunate frame for the real is-
sues at hand.  The United States does not have an unwritten constitution 
in the same sense that the United Kingdom does—no one seriously dis-
putes that claim (if it is understood narrowly).  And even the United 
Kingdom has a constitution comprised largely of writings—although the 
writings are not an integrated document but are instead a collection of 
statutes, royal proclamations, and many other texts.  Opponents of an 
unwritten constitution do not dispute the existence of judicial decisions 
that create or articulate rules of constitutional law.  In some senses, we 
do have an unwritten constitution.  In other senses, we do not.  Framing 
the issues in terms of the notion of an “unwritten constitution” obscures 
rather than illuminates the questions that are at stake. 
In this Article, we will use a substitute vocabulary.  The phrase “ex-
tratextual sources” will be used to designate sources of constitutional law 
that are outside the complete text of the U.S. Constitution (as amended).  
One incomplete version is under glass in the national archives; complete 
versions with the amendments can be found in the U.S. Code and on the 
Internet.  Extratextual sources include judicial opinions, the Articles of 
Confederation, the Declaration of Independence, the ethos of the Fram-
ing era, theories of justice, the Northwest Ordinance, and the historical 
practices of the institutions of government and the American people—
and many other things as well. 
Here is the plan.  In Part II, I will attempt to concisely formulate the 
core of originalism as a constitutional theory.  Part III will address extra-
constitutional sources, laying out a typology of the sources themselves 
                                                                                                                                      
 5. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRICIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012). 
 6. The word “syllogism” is used loosely: as stated, the argument is enthymematic, although the 
true syllogistic version could easily be stated. 
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and the roles that they can play in constitutional interpretation and con-
struction.  Part IV will then examine particular extratextual sources from 
an originalist perspective.  Part V concludes. 
II. ORIGINALISM 
Our topic is the relationship between originalism and extratextual 
sources of constitutional law.  We can begin by asking the question, 
“What is originalism?” 
A. Communicative Content and Legal Content 
Let me begin with a very general distinction in legal theory—the 
distinction between “legal content” and “communicative content.”7  As 
applied to the Constitution, this distinction marks the difference between 
the legal content of constitutional doctrine and norms, on the one hand, 
and the communicative content (linguistic meaning in context) of the 
constitutional text, on the other hand.  This distinction is fundamental to 
our investigation of the relationship between originalism and extratextu-
al sources of constitutional norms, and we need to be clear and precise 
about these foundational ideas before we proceed further. 
Let’s begin with the idea of “communicative content.”  The “com-
municative content” of a legal text is its “meaning.”  But the word 
“meaning,” standing alone is ambiguous.  When we ask the question 
“what does this clause of the Constitution mean?,” we might be asking 
about the linguistic meaning of the words—but we also might be asking 
about the effect that provision will have, or about the content of the doc-
trines of constitutional law that implement the clause.  “Communicative 
content” refers to what we can roughly call the “linguistic meaning” of 
the text in the context in which it was framed and ratified.  This rough 
and ready notion of communicative content is good enough for many 
purposes, but we can be a bit more precise. 
How does a legal text (e.g., the Constitution) communicate?  One 
part of the answer to that question focuses on the semantic meaning of 
the words and phrases that make up the text.  If we want to know the 
meaning of the Commerce Clause, we need to know the meaning of the 
words in each clause: for example, the Commerce Clause includes the 
words “regulate,” “commerce,” “among,” “several,” and “states.”8  
Words have conventional semantic meanings—meanings that are deter-
mined by patterns of usage that produce shared linguistic conventions. 
But the meaning of a clause (or a sentence in ordinary English) is 
not determined by the meaning of the words alone.  There are further 
conventions, regularities in usage that determine the way words combine 
to produce meanings.  We sometimes call these regularities “rules” of 
                                                                                                                                      
 7. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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grammar and syntax, but the term “rule” is somewhat misleading be-
cause it suggests that the regularities must conform to a prescriptive rule.  
Failure to conform would then constitute a violation—what we some-
times call a “grammatical error.”  Syntax and grammar enable meaning 
because of regularities in usage.  Communication can take advantage of 
those regularities in various ways (not just by strict adherence to a 
“rule”) and the regularities are not necessarily fully captured by the idea 
of a rule—there may be clusters and variations that are comprehended 
by competent speakers of the language. 
The principle of compositionality expresses the idea that part of the 
meaning of an utterance (e.g., a clause in the Constitution) is the product 
of the conventional semantic meaning of the words, and the regularities 
of syntax and grammar that combine them.9  The contribution made by 
conventional semantic meanings, syntax, and grammar to the full com-
municative content of an utterance can be called its “semantic content.”  
Lawyers sometimes call the semantic content of a statute its “literal 
meaning.”  In theoretical linguistics and the philosophy of language, the 
terms “syntax” and “semantics” are used to refer to the investigation of 
this component of meaning. 
But the semantic content of an utterance does not do all the work.  
The meaning of a sentence is not always its “literal meaning.”  Words are 
uttered (or authored) in a context.  This sentence (in this paper) provides 
a trivial example of the contribution made by context to meaning.  The 
sentence immediately prior to this one (beginning “This sentence. . .”) 
uses the word “this” in two places (“this sentence” and “this paper”).  
The word “this” is an indexical.10  Indexicals have conventional semantic 
meanings.  Competent speakers of English understand words like “this,” 
“here,” “now,” and so forth.  But they would not know what “this” is, or 
where “here” is, or when “now” is, unless they had information about the 
context in which these words were uttered.  Or take the word “Senate” 
as that word is used in the U.S. Constitution.11  Acontextually, “Senate” 
might mean “an assembly of citizens” or “the building in which a legisla-
tive assembly meets” or “the deliberative body of a college or university 
faculty.”  But in context, the word “Senate” refers to a particular legisla-
tive body created by the Constitution itself—the Senate of the United 
States that is part of the U.S. Congress created by the Constitution of 
1789. 
These examples of the contribution that context makes to meaning 
may seem trivial.  There is nothing complex or counterintuitive about the 
examples—they are easy cases!  But the intuitively obvious nature of 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. DONALD DAVIDSON, THEORIES OF MEANING AND LEARNABLE LANGUAGES (1965), re-
printed in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 3, 7–13 (2d ed. 2001); Richard E. Grandy, 
Understanding and the Principle of Compositionality, 4 PHIL. PERSP. 557, 560 (1990). 
 10. See David Braun, Indexicals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 15, 2007), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/; see also John Perry, Indexicals and Demonstratives, in A COMPANION 
TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 586–612 (Bob Hale & Crispin Wright eds. 1997). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
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these examples is what makes them so powerful.  They show beyond 
doubt that the communicative content of an utterance cannot be reduced 
to its semantic content.  When it comes to the contribution that context 
makes to meaning, the case of legal texts is complex.  For example, the 
clauses of the U.S. Constitution are embedded in multiple layers of con-
text.  Take the Constitution of 1789 (as it existed before amendment).  
Each Clause is embedded in a surrounding Article, and the Articles are 
embedded in the whole Constitution, which has a Preamble.  The Consti-
tution was framed and then ratified in a particular historical context.  
Some portion of the total context was shared in that it was generally 
available to the Framers, ratifiers, and citizens during the period of ratifi-
cation.  Call this common source of meaning “the publicly available con-
text of constitutional communication” (or “the publicly available con-
text” for short).  This publicly available context combines with the 
semantic meaning of the words and phrases to produce the “communica-
tive content” of the constitutional text. 
Philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics use the word 
“pragmatics” to designate the study of the effect of context on communi-
cative content.12  The contribution that context makes to communicative 
content can be called “pragmatic enrichment,” but for our purposes we 
can use the phrase “contextual enrichment” to refer to this idea. 
We can illustrate the idea of communicative content with an exam-
ple.  Take the free speech provision of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  The semantic content (or “literal meaning”) is sparse: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  Pace 
Justice Black, the literal meaning of the clause is both vague and ambig-
uous.13  What is “freedom of speech”?  What constitutes an “abridging” 
of freedom of speech?  Context enriches this content in various ways.  
The clause itself contrasts speech with press, assembly, and petition.  The 
First Amendment is structurally related to the original Constitution, 
which includes a scheme of limited and enumerated congressional pow-
ers, and the Ninth Amendment that forbids constructions of the Consti-
tution that deny or disparage rights retained by the people on the basis 
that other rights (including the freedom of speech) are enumerated.14  
And the First Amendment was ratified in a particular historical context 
some of which was shared by the members of Congress that proposed the 
Bill of Rights, state legislators who voted on ratification, and by “We the 
People,” the citizenry of the United States.  This publicly available con-
                                                                                                                                      
 12. Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2011), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pragmatics/. 
 13. JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON 3, 98–107 (1996); Justice Black and 
the Bill of Rights (CBS television broadcast Dec. 3, 1968), available at 9 SW. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1977) 
(quoting Justice Black as saying “Well, I’ll read you the part of the first amendment that caused me to 
say there are absolutes in our Bill of Rights. . . . Now, if a man were to say this to me out on the street, 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’—that’s the first amendment—I 
would think: Amen, Congress should pass no law.”). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IX. 
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text of constitutional communication may have enriched the meaning of 
the phrase “freedom of speech”—giving relatively more clarity and de-
terminacy to a phrase that would be highly underdeterminate considered 
out of context.  This enriched meaning is the communicative content of 
the Free Speech Clause. 
Now consider the legal content that is associated with the Free 
Speech Clause.  Free speech doctrine is substantially more complex and 
rich than the meaning conveyed by the text of the First Amendment—
even taking contextual enrichment into account.  The legal content of 
free speech doctrine includes a variety of complex legal rules—governing 
a wide variety of particular topics, ranging from the regulation of bill-
boards to campaign finance and child pornography on the Internet.15  
Take billboard regulation as an example: the Supreme Court has articu-
lated what it calls “the law of billboards” as a subset of free speech doc-
trine,16 but it is clearly the case that the legal content of this body of rules 
is not contained in the communicative content of the Free Speech 
Clause.  Obviously, the law of billboards is not in the semantic content—
neither the word billboard nor a synonym appears in the text.  Almost as 
obviously, the precise content of the law of billboards is not a logical im-
plication of the semantic content.  And when we add the contribution 
made by the publicly available context of constitutional utterance, it is 
also obvious that the law of billboards was not in the communicative con-
tent of the First Amendment: competent speakers of English who were 
aware of the publicly available context would not have reliably predicted 
the precise contours of the Supreme Court’s billboard doctrine. 
The general point is about the contribution that context makes to 
communicative content.  So far, I have illustrated this point using judi-
cially crafted constitutional doctrine, but the same phenomenon can oc-
cur in the political branches with constitutional constructions articulated 
explicitly (e.g., in opinion letters or preambles) or assumed implicitly in 
both individual actions and settled practices. 
More generally, the content of constitutional doctrine is far richer 
(i.e., contains more information) than does the communicative content of 
the constitutional text.  In theory, one might imagine a regime of “super 
strict construction”—in which the content of constitutional doctrine is 
required to have a one-to-one correspondence with the communicative 
content of the constitutional text.  In reality, the enormous complexity of 
constitutional practice has produced a set of constitutional doctrines that 
far outruns the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (establishing constitutional 
doctrine governing campaign finance regulation); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 
(2002) (establishing constitutional doctrine governing child pornography on the Internet); Metrome-
dia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (establishing constitutional doctrine governing 
communication via billboards). 
 16. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 501. 
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B. The Core of Originalism 
With the distinction between communicative content and legal con-
tent in place, we are now in a position to give a relatively precise state-
ment of the core of originalist constitutional theory.  We shall focus on 
the core, because originalism is itself multifarious and complex.  
Originalism has evolved, both as a mode of judicial practice and as an ac-
ademic theory.  During the course of that evolution, the originalist family 
of constitutional theories has included versions that emphasized the orig-
inal intentions of the Framers, the original understandings of the ratifi-
ers, and original public meaning.17  Despite these variations, the original-
ist family is united by agreement on two core principles, which we can 
call “the fixation thesis” and “the constraint principle.” 
The fixation thesis can be stated as follows: 
The communicative content of the Constitution (the linguistic 
meaning in context) is fixed at the time each constitutional provision 
is framed and ratified. 
The idea expressed by the fixation thesis is simple, but its full articulation 
has two distinct components.  The first component is semantic: 
The semantic content of constitutional meaning is fixed by lin-
guistic practices at the time each constitutional provision is framed 
and ratified. 
For example, the phrase “domestic violence” is used today to refer to 
spousal abuse, child abuse, and elder abuse within a family, but contem-
porary usage is not an accurate guide to the semantic meaning of the 
same phrase that appears in Article IV of the United States Constitution; 
as used in the late eighteenth century “domestic Violence” referred to 
riots, rebellions, and other forms of harmful physical force within the ter-
ritory of a political unit—in context, within the boundaries of a state.18  
The first aspect of the fixation thesis is important because meanings 
change over time; this is the well-known phenomenon of linguistic drift.19 
The second aspect of the fixation thesis goes to contextual enrich-
ment—the contribution of context to communicative content.  The con-
text of a particular utterance or writing is fixed in time.  This contextual 
component can be stated as follows: 
The publicly available context of constitutional communication 
is fixed at the time the text is framed and ratified. 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 
33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 18. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 37 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic 
Originalism 3 (Ill. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Res. Papers Series, No. 07–24, 2008), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.  For a clever and utterly implausible argument to the contrary, see 
Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
129, 133–35 (2009).  Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, 
and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 19. See SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING, at vii–
xiii (2008). 
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Before giving examples, we need to note an important clarification.  The 
context is fixed at the time the text is framed and ratified, but it includes 
the entire publicly available context—and that context may itself be 
composed of events that predate ratification. The Constitution of 1789 
was drafted in 1787 and obtained sufficient votes for ratification in 1788.  
Similarly, each amendment is proposed and ratified during a particular 
period of time.20  For this reason, the publicly available context of each 
provision of the Constitution is time bound.  The public context is likely 
to focus on communications and events that are close in time to the draft-
ing and promulgation of the text, but events in the distant past could be 
important parts of the context to the extent that framers, ratifiers, and 
citizens shared the belief they were relevant to the meaning of some con-
stitutional provision.  But future events cannot be part of the publicly 
available context of constitutional communication—not without time 
travel! 
In sum, the fixation thesis expresses the idea that communicative 
content is fixed in time.  The thesis results from two facts about meaning: 
(1) semantic content is fixed by linguistic practice at the time of utter-
ance, and (2) the context of an utterance is time bound. 
The fixation thesis is the first element of the core of contemporary 
originalism.  The second element is the constraint principle.  The idea of 
the constraint principle is simple and highly intuitive: 
The communicative content of the constitutional text should 
constrain the content of constitutional doctrine. 
Although it might be theoretically possible for an originalist to view 
originalism as a purely linguistic theory, in practice originalists are con-
cerned with the relationship between original meaning and constitutional 
practice, including the content of constitutional doctrine.  At a minimum, 
originalists believe that the original public meaning of the text should 
play some role in determining how courts should decide cases and how 
other officials and branches (e.g., the President and Congress) should act.  
The role that communicative content plays in determining legal content 
and effect can be called its “contribution.”  Many living constitutionalists 
would agree that the original meaning of the text (if ascertainable) 
should play some role in determining the content of contemporary con-
stitutional doctrine—although they may believe that original meaning 
can be trumped or outweighed by other factors.  Living constitutionalists 
of this sort can be seen as affirming a very weak form of originalism. 
Theorists who describe themselves as originalists characteristically 
believe that the contribution of the text to doctrine should be more ro-
bust—the constraint principle is meant to express this core belief in an 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution is a special case; it was proposed by 
Congress on September 25, 1789, but ratification did not occur until May 7, 1992.  See Certification of 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relating to Compensation of Members of Con-
gress, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,187, 21,187–88 (May 19, 1992). 
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abstract way that leaves room for differences among the different mem-
bers of the originalist family of theories. 
Together the fixation thesis and the constraint principle express the 
core of contemporary originalist thought.  These are the ideas on which 
almost all originalists agree.  As the historical evolution of originalist 
thought demonstrates, there is another topic upon which originalists have 
disagreed.  We can introduce this topic via a question: what determines 
original meaning?  In this Article, I will focus on one answer to this ques-
tion—the version of originalism that is sometimes called “original public 
meaning originalism” or “the new originalism.” 
C. Public Meaning Originalism 
The history of originalism includes a set of variations on the theme 
of original meaning.  Some originalists have emphasized the original in-
tentions of the Framers, others the original understanding of the ratifiers, 
and others the original public meaning of the constitutional text.21  This 
Article will adopt original-public-meaning originalism as the model case 
of originalism for two reasons.  First, public-meaning originalism is the 
dominant form of originalism in contemporary originalist scholarship.22  
Second, for reasons that I have explored at length in other work, I be-
lieve that public-meaning originalism is the best candidate for the correct 
or true theory of constitutional meaning.23  In this Article, we shall simply 
stipulate that public-meaning originalism serves as a model case of con-
temporary originalist theory.24 
What is public-meaning originalism?  Like other originalist theories, 
public-meaning originalism affirms the fixation thesis and the constraint 
principle.  What is distinctive about public-meaning originalism can be 
expressed as the “public meaning thesis”: 
The communicative content of the Constitution is fixed (1) by 
the conventional semantic meaning of the text as understood by 
competent speakers of American English and (2) by the contextual 
enrichment added by the publicly available context at the time each 
provision of the Constitution was framed and ratified. 
Thus, the communicative content of the Constitution of 1789 is fixed by 
linguistic practice and the publicly available context of the founding era.  
Similarly, the communicative content of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
fixed by linguistic practice and context in 1866 through 1868. 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. See SOLUM, supra note 17, at 12, 33.  
 22. Id. at 22–33. 
 23. See Solum, supra note 18, at 2, 18–19; LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, We are all Originalists Now. in 
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM : A DEBATE 1, 54–64 
(2011). 
 24. The phrase “model case” expresses the idea that public meaning originalism provides a mod-
el or instance of originalism.  Another version of originalism could have been selected for this purpose. 
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D. The Interpretation-Construction Distinction 
One more idea is required to complete our description of original-
ism.  This idea can be called “the interpretation-construction distinc-
tion.”25  This distinction marks the difference between two related activi-
ties within constitutional practice.  The first activity is the discovery of 
the communicative content of a legal utterance; I will use the term “in-
terpretation” to name this first activity.  The second activity is the deter-
mination of the legal content and legal effect produced by a legal text; I 
will use the term “construction” to name this second and distinct activity.  
The interpretation-construction distinction is an old one in American le-
gal theory, and it has been much discussed recently in constitutional the-
ory,26 but the words “interpretation” and “construction” are also used in 
a broader sense to refer to both activities (discovering meaning and de-
termining legal effect).  Nothing hangs on the terminology, since we 
could describe the interpretation-construction distinction using other 
words.27 
To understand the significance of the interpretation-construction 
distinction for constitutional theory, we need to grasp another, related 
distinction from the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics—
the distinction between “vagueness” and “ambiguity.”28  When we com-
municate via language (written or oral), we use words and phrases that 
can be formed into complex expressions using the rules of syntax and 
grammar.  Sometimes, the smallest meaningful unit of expression is a 
single word.  Other times, whole phrases carry meanings that cannot be 
decomposed into the meaning of constituent words.  But whatever the 
relevant unit of meaning might be, both words and phrases can be either 
vague or ambiguous. 
In ordinary speech, the distinction between vagueness and ambigui-
ty is not always observed.  The two terms are sometimes used inter-
changeably, and when this is the case, they both mark a general lack of 
what we might call “determinacy” (or “clarity” or “certainty”) of mean-
ing.  But the terms “vague” and “ambiguous” also have technical (or 
more precise) meanings, such that there is a real difference in their 
meaning. 
In this technical sense, ambiguity refers to the multiplicity of sense: 
a term is ambiguous if it has more than one sense.  A classic example is 
the word “cool.”  In one sense “cool” means “low temperature,” as in, 
“The room was so cool we could see our breath.”  In another sense, 
“cool” means something like “hip” or “stylish,” as in, “Miles Davis was 
so cool that every young trumpet player imitated him.”  And cool has 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, FORDHAM L. REV. (forth-
coming). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 
96 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 96–97. 
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several other senses—referring to temperament or self-control, to certain 
colors, and a lack of enthusiasm (or the presence of skepticism or mild 
hostility). 
The technical sense of vagueness refers to the existence of border-
line cases: a term is vague if there are cases where the term might or 
might not apply.  A classic example is the word “tall.”  In one sense, 
“tall” refers to height (of a person or other entity) that is higher (in some 
way or to some degree) than average.  Abraham Lincoln was tall: at al-
most 6’4” he was a paradigm case of tall for his time.  Napoleon was not 
tall, although at 5’6” he was of average height for his time (British prop-
aganda depicted him as short).  There are persons who are clearly tall 
and clearly not tall, then there are borderline cases: for example, in the 
United States in the twenty-first century, males who are 5’11” are neither 
clearly tall nor clearly not.  Finally, a given word or phrase can be both 
vague and ambiguous.  Cool is ambiguous, and in the temperature sense, 
it is also vague. 
How does the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness relate 
to the interpretation construction distinction?  Consider the case of am-
biguity first.  Many words and phrases have the property of semantic 
ambiguity.  That is, when a word or phrase is considered acontextually, it 
can have more than one meaning.  Consider the thought experiment of a 
message in a bottle.  You are at the beach and you find a slip of paper 
that contains only the word “cool” or the phrase “domestic violence.”  
You can guess at the meaning, but you won’t know how the author was 
using the word, because you lack information about context.  Consider 
the same words as they appear in messages that provide additional con-
text: “Hey dude, this message in a bottle thing is totally cool.”  Or: “I am 
a victim of domestic violence.  Please protect me from my father.”  The 
additional context—in these cases provided by the sentence in which the 
message appears—is sufficient to resolve the semantic ambiguity. 
In the interpretation of legal texts in general (and constitutional in-
terpretation in particular), ambiguity can usually be resolved by resort to 
the publicly available context of communication.  In the context of con-
stitutional law (as opposed to arguing about constitutional theory), the 
phrase “domestic violence” is unambiguous.  We know that it refers to 
things like insurrections, riots, and rebellions—not spousal, child, or el-
der abuse within a family.  We can restate this point more formally: 
Characteristically, ambiguity in the semantic content of a consti-
tutional text is liquidated by context and hence does not appear in the 
communicative content of the text. 
Because “interpretation” in the technical sense in which we are using 
that word is just the activity that ascertains the communicative content of 
a text, it follows that ambiguity in semantic content can usually be re-
solved by interpretation (so long as the interpreter takes context into ac-
count). 
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The qualifying word “characteristically” expresses the notion that 
there is no guarantee that semantic ambiguity can be resolved by context.  
For example, it might be the case that complete information about the 
publicly available context of constitutional communication would resolve 
the ambiguity, but the relevant evidence of that context is no longer 
available because of the passage of time.  Another possibility is that the 
text is inherently ambiguous.  This could occur because the drafters of a 
legal text were unable to compromise on some issue.  In this situation, 
they might choose language that is deliberately ambiguous and hence 
cannot be liquidated by resort to context.  We can call these special cases 
“irreducible ambiguity.” 
Now consider vagueness.  Recall that if a word is vague, the seman-
tic meaning of the word admits of borderline cases.  Hart expressed a 
similar idea with his notion of “core” and “penumbra.”29  In the core of 
settled meaning, the applicability of the rule to a particular case is clear.  
In the penumbra, we have a borderline case—where the application of 
the rule is underdetermined by the legal materials that are its source.  
Outside the penumbra, the rule clearly does not apply.  Related to the 
notion of vagueness is the idea of “open texture”: the relationship be-
tween vagueness and open texture may be complicated, but for our pur-
poses on this occasion we can treat open texture as a species of vague-
ness. 
Of course, we have recognized that there is a distinction between 
communicative content and legal content.  From the fact that the com-
municative content (linguistic meaning in context) of a constitutional 
provision is vague, it does not automatically follow that the legal content 
is also vague—a vague constitutional provision could have received an 
authoritative construction that eliminates the vagueness. 
Vague texts characteristically require construction.  Of course, there 
are a variety of ways in which construction can liquidate ambiguity.  A 
vague text can be translated into a bright line rule.  Or the vague text can 
give rise to a multifactor-balancing test, the application of which will re-
solve the borderline case.  Or the law may give a judge or other official 
discretion to decide the case by an ad hoc, all-things-considered judg-
ment.  Each of these modes of construction is a method by which the 
vague legal text can be given determinate legal effect.  The take-away 
point is: 
 Characteristically, vagueness in the communicative content of a 
constitutional text is resolved by a legal norm that enables determina-
tion of the legal content or legal effect of the text. 
Because “construction” in the technical sense in which we are using that 
word is just the activity that ascertains the legal content and effect of a 
                                                                                                                                      
 29. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119–20 (1961); see also H. L. A. Hart, Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606–15 (1958). 
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text, it follows that vagueness in communicative content is usually re-
solved by construction—although there may be exceptions.30 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND EXTRATEXTUAL SOURCES 
We can now return to our problem: can originalists embrace a par-
tially unwritten constitution?  Because the phrase “unwritten Constitu-
tion” is unfortunate for our purposes, we can ask this question more 
clearly: can originalists embrace extratextual sources of the legal content 
of constitutional doctrine and practice?  We can address this question in 
two steps.  First, we need to say something about extratextual sources—
what are they?  Second, we need to investigate the role that extratextual 
sources can play in constitutional interpretation and construction.  When 
we have taken those two steps, we will be in a position to give an abstract 
answer to our question about originalism and extratextual sources of 
constitutional doctrine and practice.  After we state the abstract answer, 
we will turn to a more particularized inquiry. 
A. Typology: Sources of Constitutional Norms 
What are the sources of constitutional norms?  That’s a big ques-
tion.  To make it more manageable, we can begin by distinguishing be-
tween two kinds of sources, which we can call “textual sources” and “ex-
tratextual sources.”  We might think of the textual sources as divided 
into two categories.  The first category consists of contiguous strings of 
constitutional text that are marked off as discrete units of constitutional 
meaning; we can call these text strings “clauses.”  The second category of 
textual sources has to do with the properties of the text that emerge from 
the ways in which individual clauses relate to one another.  We can call 
these relationships between clauses “structural features of the constitu-
tional text” or “structure” for short.31 
The second kind of source comes from outside the constitutional 
text—extratextual sources.  At this stage of our investigation, we want to 
suspend judgment about the legitimacy of these extratextual sources—we 
are merely listing the possible candidates for the role of plausible sources 
of constitutional norms.  Again, we can categorize the possibilities.  One 
category consists of foundational documents other than the Constitution 
of the United States; examples include the Declaration of Independence, 
the Treaty of Paris, and the Articles of Confederation.  Another category 
consists of documents and records that relate to the Framing and ratifica-
tion of the original Constitution and its amendments; examples include 
The Federalist Papers, Madison’s notes of the Philadelphia Convention, 
                                                                                                                                      
 30. Here is one possible exception: There may be some cases in which contextual enrichment 
precisifies a vague word or phrase.  That is, there may be cases in which the semantic content contrib-
uted by a term is vague, but the communicative content is not vague because the publicly available 
context adds precisification—reducing the zone of underdetermination. 
 31. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
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and the records of the ratifying conventions.  A third category of possible 
sources consists of moral and political values.32  The fourth category is 
social norms and values—the content of these norms may correspond to 
true propositions of political morality, but this need not be the case.  The 
fourth category refers to what is sometimes called “ethos”—the positive 
morality of a particular political culture.  The fifth category is institution-
al practice.  One particularly salient member of this category consists of 
judicial decisions and opinions—that is, “precedent.”  But the practices 
of nonjudicial actors could also serve as a source of constitutional norms; 
sometimes the term “historical practice” is used to describe a subset of 
this category.  Finally, the logical space of extratextual sources includes 
the idea that constitutional law might simply be “made up” by some offi-
cial; judges come to mind. 
Our typology is summarized in Table 1, which appears immediately 
below: 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. This third category—moral and political values—raises certain worries about the use of the 
word “source,” because some legal positivists may believe that moral facts cannot determine legal con-
tent.  Let us set aside positivist worries about use of the word “source” to describe the role that politi-
cal morality could play in determining the content of constitutional norms; if you wish, you can substi-
tute “constitutional actors’ beliefs about moral and political values.”  The third category is described in 
terms of the values themselves (or the officials’ beliefs about them). 
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TABLE 1: SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
From the Constitutional Text (Textual Sources)
Clauses Commerce Clause, the 11th 
Amendment, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. 
Structure The structure of the Constitution 
or its parts, e.g., the relationship 
between the grants of power in the 
first three Articles. 
Outside the Constitution (Extratextual Sources)
Other Foundational Documents The Treaty of Paris, the Declara-
tion of Independence, the Articles 
of Confederation, State Constitu-
tions, “Superstatutes” 
Documents and Records Relating 
to the Framing and Ratification of 
the Original Constitution or its 
Amendments 
Madison’s Notes, the Ratification 
Debates, the Federalist Papers, 
the Antifederalist Papers 
Moral and Political Philosophy 
(Values) 
Consequentialism, Deontology, 
Virtue Ethics, Social Contract 
Theory, Justice as Fairness, Popu-
lar Sovereignty Theory 
Social Norms and Values Systems of belief and associated 
behavior, shared beliefs about mo-
rality and politics, popular beliefs 
about the actual or ideal content 
of constitutional norms 
Institutional Practice Judicial decisions, legislation and 
statutes, rules, practices, and in-
formal norms of Congress and the 
Executive branch, also the analog 
of these at the state and local level 
Discretion The discretionary decisions of of-
ficials, including judges and execu-
tive branch officials 
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B. Three Roles for Extratextual Sources in Constitutional Interpretation 
and Construction 
Our typology provides a rough and ready categorization of the pos-
sible sources of constitutional norms.  Our next step is to focus on the ex-
tratextual sources and investigate the roles they might play in the activi-
ties of constitutional interpretation and construction.  Let’s begin with 
the role that such sources might play in interpretation. 
1. Extratextual Evidence of Meaning (Communicative Content) 
Interpretation aims to recover the communicative content of the 
text in context.  In some cases, the interpretive enterprise is easy.  We 
can discern the semantic context of the text because we are competent 
speakers of the natural English language; in many cases, the semantic 
content of the Constitution is easily accessible because the words and 
phrases used at the time the provision was drafted have the same mean-
ings today.  Frequently, we know enough about context without investi-
gation.  But in other cases, the meaning of the text will be relatively inac-
cessible.  The meaning of the words may be unfamiliar, or we may need 
to know more about context. 
Extratextual sources can aid interpretation.  First, extratextual 
sources can provide evidence of the conventional semantic meaning of 
the words and phrases that comprise the constitutional text.  Evidence of 
the meaning of the phrase “legislative power” might be found in the Fed-
eralist Papers or in the institutional practices of the Continental Congress 
or the early Congresses of the United States.  An understanding of the 
ethos of the founding era might aid in discerning the meaning of the 
phrase “freedom of speech,” or we might look to the legal practice of the 
founding era for an elucidation of the notion of “freedom of the press.”  
Of course, if we are original public-meaning originalists, we will be look-
ing for two particular kinds of evidence—evidence of conventional se-
mantic meanings or evidence of enrichment from the publicly available 
context of communication. 
2. Extratextual Contributions to Constitutional Constructions Bound to 
the Text 
The Constitution of the United States includes a variety of provi-
sions that are general and abstract; some of these are vague or open-
textured.  These provisions may have a core of settled meaning, but to 
the extent that they are vague, they will have a penumbra—the space of 
possible cases where the communicative content of the text underdeter-
mines legal content and effect.  We can call this space, “the construction 
zone.”  In the construction zone, the linguistic meaning of the text cannot 
tell us how to decide particular cases.  Constitutional construction that 
goes beyond translation of communicative content into legal content will 
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be required. 33  When constitutional construction operates within a con-
struction zone created by the constitutional text, we can say that the con-
struction is “bound to the text.”34 
Theories of constitutional interpretation provide an account of the 
communicative content of the constitutional text.  Theories of constitu-
tional construction are different—they are normative theories about 
what we ought to do with that content.  Characteristically, originalist 
theories of constitutional construction will respect the constraint princi-
ple—they will only sanction constructions that are consistent with the 
communicative content of the text.  In easy cases, construction may take 
place without resort to extratextual sources—the text may be sufficient 
to provide the legal content that resolves the cases.35  But in hard cases, 
even originalists may resort to extratextual sources to provide legal con-
tent. 
Consider the First Amendment freedom of speech.  Because the 
text is general, abstract, and vague, we are in the construction zone.  In a 
particular case, more than one outcome may be consistent with the 
communicative content of the constitutional text.  If we look to free 
speech doctrine as a whole, there are multiple versions of the doctrine 
that are consistent with the communicative content of the doctrine.  This 
means that we will need to look outside the four corners of the text and 
the publicly available content of constitutional communication to resolve 
at least some possible cases that could arise under the First Amendment 
freedom of speech. 
For example, we might attempt to formulate a theory of free ex-
pression that gives more definite content to the phrase “freedom of 
speech.”  In formulating that theory, we might consider a variety of ex-
tratextual sources.  We might look directly to more general theories of 
political morality: Ronald Dworkin advocates a method of this kind.36  
Or we might look to the political morality of the founding generation—
the free speech ethos of late eighteenth-century America.  Or we might 
instead look to the free speech values that characterize America today.  
                                                                                                                                      
 33. Solum, supra note 25. 
 34. The phrase “bound to the text” is being used in a stipulated sense.  Constructions that are 
bound to the text are stipulated to be constructions that operate within the zone of underdetermina-
tion created by vague or irreducibly ambiguous terms. 
 35. In some cases, this will mean that the legal content of constitutional doctrine will be suffi-
ciently determined by the communicative content of the text to determine the outcome of the case.  In 
such cases, the activity of construction consists in translating the communicative content of the text 
into the equivalent legal content (or constitutional doctrine).  These are likely to be “easy cases,” and 
because they are easy, the activity of construction may go unnoticed or seem automatic.  See Solum, 
supra note 25. 
Here is an example: Article One provides that each state shall have two senators.  U.S. CONST. 
art I, § 3, cl. 1.  Because senators are human beings, borderline cases do not arise.  Senators Boxer and 
Feinstein are two senators—not one or three.  Constitutional construction is at work here—the consti-
tutional practice (which determines legal effect) is to follow the original meaning of the Constitution.  
It could be otherwise; someone might advocate for an amending construction that reapportioned the 
Senate by population.  But on this particular issue, living constitutionalists and originalists are united 
in (tacitly or consciously) endorsing the constraint principle. 
 36. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  
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Or we might attempt to discern the theories of freedom of speech that 
were implicit in the institutional practices of the Founding Era. 
This Article does not explore the justifications for originalism.  Ra-
ther, the Article simply assumes an originalist perspective (with public 
meaning originalism as the model case).  But when it comes to originalist 
theories of constitutional construction, the underlying justification for 
originalism can and likely will make a difference.  Theoretical consisten-
cy will demand that the originalist theory of constitutional construction 
cohere with the underlying normative justification for the constraint 
principle.  If the constraint principle is justified by an account of popular 
sovereignty, then the theory of constitutional construction must be con-
sistent with popular sovereignty (in light of other relevant political val-
ues).  If the constraint principle is justified by rule-of-law considerations, 
then the theory of constitutional construction must be consistent with the 
rule of law (or departures must be justified by other salient political val-
ues). 
Thus, the requirement of theoretical consistency has implications 
for the way in which particular originalist theories treat the various cate-
gories of extratextual sources.  If the constraint principle were justified 
by rule of law consideration and a distrust of the institutional capacity of 
judges to make objective morally-correct decisions, then the theory of 
constitutional construction would do well to avoid a reliance on the judg-
es’ own beliefs about political morality.  If the constraint principle is jus-
tified by popular sovereignty theory, then it might follow that the social 
norms and values of “We the People” today should play a role in consti-
tutional construction.  Of course, these are only toy examples—working 
up a full-fledged theory of constitutional construction cannot be accom-
plished on this occasion.  The toy examples are provided for illustration 
only—to show how the requirement of theoretical constraint might oper-
ate for particular versions of originalism. 
3. Extratextual Sources of Constitutional Norms Not Bound to the Text 
We have just considered the possibility that extratextual sources 
might be used to flesh out the content of constitutional constructions that 
are bound to the text.  But it is at least theoretically possible that there 
might be constitutional constructions that are “freestanding” or “un-
bound”—that cannot be connected to the zone of underdetermination 
created by a particular clause or to the structure of the Constitution as a 
whole or in part. 
To illustrate this idea, we can pursue a counterfactual hypothetical.  
Suppose that the Constitution had absolutely nothing to say about un-
enumerated rights.  Imagine, for example, that the Ninth Amendment 
had not been ratified and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not con-
tain any provision with communicative content that provides a textual 
basis for unenumerated rights.  (Suppose for example the Fourteenth 
Amendment had not included “due process,” “equal protection,” or 
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“privileges or immunities.”)  Could originalists nonetheless endorse con-
stitutional constructions that created judicially enforceable unenumerat-
ed rights? 
The answer to this question will depend on the content of the par-
ticular version of originalism.  Originalism’s two core ideas, the fixation 
thesis and the constraint principle, do not tell us whether unbound un-
enumerated rights are permissible.  Although the general formulation of 
the constraint principle itself does not answer our question, there are 
particular versions of the constraint principle that do.  Consider the view 
that we have dubbed “super strict construction.”  On that view each and 
every judicially enforceable rule of constitutional law must directly trans-
late the communicative content of the constitutional text: this version of 
the constraint principle might be called “constraint as equivalence.”  At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, consider a version of the constraint 
principle that requires only consistency—constitutional doctrine must 
not contradict the communicative content of the text: we might call this 
version, “constraint as consistency.”  Constraint as consistency would al-
low for constitutional doctrine that is a superset of those doctrines that 
are required by the communicative content of the text.  Finally, the con-
straint principle might be interpreted in light of the notion of bounded-
ness.  This version of the principle would limit legitimate constitutional 
construction to those constructions that are within the construction zones 
created by particular clauses or the constitutional structure: we might call 
this version “constraint as boundedness.”  So we have three different 
versions of the constraint principle, with different implications for the le-
gitimacy of resort to extrajudicial sources that are not bound to the text. 
We have now categorized extrajudicial sources and the roles they 
might play in the activities of constitutional interpretation and construc-
tion.  This completes our investigation of extratextual sources at the level 
of abstraction.  The next phase of our investigation will examine particu-
lar sources and the role that they should play in constitutional interpreta-
tion and construction—from an originalist perspective. 
IV. ORIGINALISM AND EXTRATEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONTENT 
We have now established a theoretical framework that will enable 
us to examine the role of extratextual sources in constitutional interpre-
tation and construction from an originalist perspective.  Recapitulating 
briefly, we have: (1) identified the core of contemporary originalist theo-
ry, (2) marked the distinction between interpretation and construction, 
(3) identified the construction zone, (4) categorized extratextual sources, 
and (5) specified the different roles that these sources might play in con-
stitutional interpretation or construction.  We can now apply this frame-
work to particular types of constitutional argument.  In each case, we will 
examine the type and then consider its relationship to the proper attitude 
of originalism toward the use of extratextual sources in constitutional in-
terpretation and construction. 
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A. Constitutional Implications 
The Constitution may “imply” things that it does not say.  Let us 
call the content that is implied but not stated “constitutional implica-
tion.”  Some theorists treat constitutional doctrines that are derived or 
discovered by “implication” from the constitutional text as examples of 
an unwritten constitution.  For example, Akhil Amar, in his book Ameri-
ca’s Unwritten Constitution, suggests that we “read between the lines of 
the Constitution—to see what principles are implicit in the document, 
read as a whole, even if these principles are nowhere explicitly stated in 
any specific clause.”37  The word “implicit” is the adjective form of the 
verb “implied” and the corresponding noun “implication.”  An “implica-
tion” is a conclusion that can be drawn from something, although it is not 
explicitly stated. 
In this section we are investigating “constitutional implication.”  Be-
fore we proceed further, we should note a terminological difficulty.  The 
term “implication” can be used to refer to a variety of linguistic phenom-
ena.  For example, “implication” may be used as a synonym for “logical 
implication” or “entailment.”  But we might also use the word “implica-
tion” to refer to certain forms of contextual enrichment: in the philoso-
phy of language and theoretical linguistics special terminology is used to 
distinguish the distinct phenomena covered by the umbrella word “impli-
cation.”  Thus, implication can be distinguished from “implicature,” 38 
“impliciture,” 39 and so forth.  More on those below, but for now we shall 
stipulate that the word “implication” is used to refer to logical implica-
tion or entailment. 
Everyone understands that legal texts have logical implications.  We 
can express these implications in simple syllogisms: 
Premise 1: “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each State.”40 
Premise 2: Alaska is a state. 
Conclusion: ∴ Alaska is entitled to two senators. 
The text of the Constitution does not mention Alaska, but from 
what the text does say and from the true factual premise that Alaska is a 
state, we can imply that Alaska is entitled to two senators. 
This account of constitutional implication is not quite right.  The 
first premise is a quote from the text of Article I and the Seventeenth 
Amendment.  Premise two is a fact.  The conclusion is a rule of law.  
Strictly speaking, the argument needs an additional step or two—which 
move from the text to the communicative content and then to the associ-
ated legal content.  We can easily imagine an expanded version of the 
syllogism that fills in the missing steps. 
                                                                                                                                      
 37. AMAR, supra note 5, at xv. 
 38. See infra text accompanying note 41. 
 39. See infra note 45. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1. 
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What is absolutely clear is that originalism should endorse constitu-
tional implication as a general method of constitutional construction.  
Constitutional implications are not in the text, but they follow from the 
text. 
B. Contextual Enrichment 
We have already introduced the idea of contextual enrichment.  For 
public-meaning originalists, the public meaning of the text is produced by 
the semantic content of the text as enriched by the publicly available con-
text of constitutional interpretation.  Contextual enrichment happens in 
various ways, and a complete typology is outside the scope of what can 
be accomplished on this occasion.  Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that some forms of contextual enrichment may be called “implications” 
in ordinary English.  But since we are limiting the use of the term “impli-
cation” to the stipulated sense of logical implication or entailment, we 
need a richer vocabulary to describe some of the forms of contextual en-
richment. 
On this occasion, we shall investigate one form of contextual en-
richment, which we shall call “implicature,” using the word coined by the 
philosopher Paul Grice.41  One way to get at the notion of implicature is 
to distinguish it from implication.  Here is how Kent Bach expresses the 
distinction: 
The difference [between implication and implicature] is fun-
damental.  If a sentence is true, what it implies must be true, where-
as a speaker can utter a true sentence and implicate something 
false.  For example, you could say that there’s a gas station around 
the corner and falsely implicate that it’s open and selling gas (may-
be it’s closed for the night or maybe there’s a gasoline shortage).  If 
there’s a gas station around the corner, it doesn’t follow that the gas 
station is open and selling gas.  But it does follow that the gas sta-
tion is not directly across the street.42 
Implications flow logically.  Implicatures are communicated by utteranc-
es in context.  To elaborate, consider the following exchange: 
Ben: Where can I buy some gas? 
Alice: There is a gas station around the corner. 
Alice did not say, “You can buy gas at the station around the cor-
ner,” but in context, what she did say creates an implicature to that ef-
fect.  Or consider the classic example of a letter of recommendation—by 
a professor and for a former student who is applying for a tenure-track 
faculty position.  The letter says, “Ben attended class with regularity, and 
was unfailingly punctual,” and nothing else.  This statement has no logi-
                                                                                                                                      
 41. Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2010), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/implicature/. 
 42. KENT BACH, The Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature, in DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES 
OF MEANING: NEO-GRICEAN STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR OF LAURENCE R. 
HORN 21, 22 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006). 
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cal implications regarding Ben’s suitability for a tenure-track job, but 
given the context, the implicature is that Ben is completely unsuitable.  If 
the best you can say about Ben is that his attendance was regular and 
punctual, the implicature is that in other dimensions he must fall woeful-
ly short. 
Implicature is a general phenomenon that occurs in a variety of 
communicative settings, but we are concerned with a special category of 
legal implicature, which we can call “constitutional implicature.”43  The 
question at hand is whether originalists should endorse the idea that con-
stitutional implicatures contribute to the communicative content bound 
to particular constitutional provisions (or to the constitutional structure).  
The answer to that question would appear to be “yes.”  The version of 
public-meaning originalism that we have examined as our model case is 
fully consistent with the constitutional implicature as a method for con-
stitutional interpretation.  Constitutional implicature goes beyond se-
mantic content; if the meaning of the Constitution were limited to its se-
mantic content, its meaning would be very sparse—we would read the 
Constitution as if we knew nothing about the context in which it was 
framed and ratified.  Depriving ourselves of all knowledge of context 
produces a “stripped down Constitution.”  We wouldn’t know whether 
the Constitution had been adopted in the United States in the eighteenth 
century, as opposed to being a fictional constitution in an alternative his-
tory novel.  We would know nothing of the Articles of Confederation, 
the Revolutionary War, or English common law. 
The public meaning of the Constitution is not the meaning of the 
stripped-down Constitution.  For public-meaning originalism, the aim is 
to recover the full communicative content of the Constitution—the lin-
guistic meaning as enriched by the publicly available context of constitu-
tional communication.  Constitutional implicatures arise from the public-
ly available context of constitutional communication. 
Consider for example, the enumerated power “to establish post of-
fices and post roads.”44  The semantic content of the Post Clause does not 
include a power to carry and deliver the mail: only the offices and roads 
are authorized.  And we cannot get from offices and roads to delivery by 
constitutional implication (logical necessity).  It is logically possible to 
have the former powers without the latter.  This is easily demonstrable as 
we can imagine a logically consistent version of the postal power that 
reads as follows: “Congress shall have the power to establish post offices 
and post roads, but the several states shall organize services for the de-
livery of the mail from the post offices to homes and businesses.” 
The power to deliver mail is neither stated explicitly nor logically 
implied, but no one doubts that the postal power includes the power to 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. See Solum, supra note 18, at 56–57 (coining the phrase “constitutional implicature”); see also 
Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 615, 624–25 (2009). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
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deliver the mail.  That power is part of the communicative content of the 
Post Clause, because it follows from the clause as a matter of constitu-
tional implicature.45  Precisely this sort of implicature was the basis of 
John Marshall’s statement in McCulloch v. Maryland: the explicit power 
“to establish post offices and post roads” creates an implicated power “of 
carrying the mail along the post road, from one post office to another.”46  
As Ryan Williams observes, “Even without the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the implication of such a power would likely have struck most 
observers as so natural and obvious that a narrower interpretation deny-
ing such a power would have seemed absurd.”47  (Note that Williams is 
using the word “implication” in the broad sense that includes implica-
tures.) 
Deep and interesting questions remain for originalists.  In particu-
lar, originalists should investigate the mechanics and mechanisms of con-
stitutional implicature.  In this regard, Williams’s work is pioneering.  Af-
ter recognizing the legitimacy of constitutional implicature,48 Williams 
suggests the following criterion: 
[I]f the implied content is not semantically encoded in the text, 
interpreters should inquire whether a reasonable member of the 
ratifying public at the time of enactment would have recognized the 
implied content as following obviously and noncontroversially from 
the choice of the particular language used in the provision and the 
relevant background context.49 
Further refinements may be required.  The notion of a “reasonable 
member of the ratifying public” is a legal notion.  But the question that 
we are asking is not a legal question—it is a question about meaning.  So 
we might substitute “competent speaker of American English” for “rea-
sonable member.”  Williams uses the phrase “implied content,” but this 
usage runs the risk of conflating implication and implicature.  We might 
substitute, “implicated content.”  Williams suggests that constitutional 
implicature be limited to content that is obvious and noncontroversial, 
but it is not clear that this is the way that implicature always works.  
Sometimes the communicative content of a text may not be “obvious”—
                                                                                                                                      
 45. I am using “implicature” in a broad sense that encompasses a variety of more particular 
forms of contextual enrichment.  In the case of postal roads and the power to deliver the mail, the pre-
cise form of contextual enrichment may be “impliciture”: something that is “implicit” goes without 
saying or is implicit in what is said. See Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 
124–162 (1994). 
 46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819). 
 47. Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
498, 543–44 (2011).  I have adapted the Postal Clause example from Williams’s elegant and important 
article. 
 48. Id. at 544.  Williams’s discussion of this point is somewhat misleading given the technical way 
that “implication” and “implicature” are used in the relevant literature.  He suggests that constitution-
al implications should be recognized if “the putatively implied content arises as a matter of logical ne-
cessity due to a noncancellable, semantically encoded formulation.”  Id.  This formulation is correct, 
but Williams characterizes this principle as a component of a test “for recognizing constitutional impli-
catures.”  Id.  That characterization is inaccurate.  The logical consequences of semantic content are 
implications, not implicatures. See BACH, supra note 42, at 26. 
 49. Williams, supra note 47, at 544. 
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it may be that competent speakers would need to read carefully to see the 
implicature.  Likewise, the existence of controversy does not automati-
cally cancel an implicature.  Interpretation and construction of legal 
texts, and especially of the Constitution, involve motivated reasoning; 
vested interests or passionate ideologues may create controversy about 
implicatures that would be recognized by competent speakers motivated 
by a desire to understand the text.  As a matter of constitutional interpre-
tation, the question is whether the implicature is correct and not whether 
it is disputed. 
We might reformulate Williams’s proposed principle as follows: 
Constitutional implicatures arise when competent speakers of 
the language at the time the constitutional provision was framed and 
ratified would draw the implicature from the text given the publicly 
available context of constitutional communication. 
Further questions remain.  Implicature gives rise to special cases of 
vagueness and ambiguity.  When an implicature has vague content, the 
implicature creates a construction zone—the content of the implicature is 
not sufficient to resolve the case: constitutional construction will be re-
quired.  Another possibility is that competent speakers with knowledge 
of the publicly available context of constitutional communication would 
disagree about what the content of the implicature is.  This is a special 
case of ambiguity, “implicative ambiguity.”  Usually semantic ambiguity 
can be resolved by reference to context, in the case of implicative ambi-
guity, context creates the ambiguity.  Of course, it might be the case that 
the ambiguity appears when some subset of the publicly available context 
of constitutional communication is considered, but resolves in light of the 
full context.  But it is at least theoretically possible that ambiguity is irre-
ducible, and hence that constitutional construction will be required. 
We can imagine a variety of possible approaches to construction 
when an irreducible implicative ambiguity exists.  We can explore this 
problem in the context of its most famous exemplar—the Ninth 
Amendment. 
C. The Ninth Amendment 
The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  We can begin with the 
word “construed.”  The Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction in 
the technical sense.  This is not a product of the perhaps fortuitous use of 
“construed” which is a form of the same root word as “construction.”  
Rather, it follows from the interpretation-construction distinction and 
the implication-implicature distinction.  The Constitution enumerates 
certain rights in Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, in Article IV, and in vari-
ous amendments, including the first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
and subsequent to the Ninth Amendment in various other amendments, 
including the Fourteenth Amendment.  As a matter of interpretation, the 
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enumeration of these rights could not give rise to a constitutional impli-
cature that denied or disparaged other rights retained by the people.  
The semantic content of the enumerated rights consists of positive state-
ments about the right in question—freedom of speech, the right to bear 
arms, and so forth.  The fact of enumeration is a structural feature of the 
Constitution.  Nothing in the semantic content of the rights contains a 
semantic content that explicitly denies or disparages other rights retained 
by the people.  But it is at least possible that the communicative content 
of the enumeration of particular rights gives rise to an implicature that 
denies or disparages other rights.  The reasoning would go as follows: 
The Constitution enumerates a list of particular rights of the 
people.  The point of enumerating particular rights (and omitting a 
more general statement) is to create an exhaustive list.  Therefore, 
the enumerated rights are the only rights retained by the people. 
The semantic content of the Ninth Amendment forbids this form of im-
plicature, and it would forbid this implicature even if the implicature best 
captured the public meaning of the Constitution as it would have been 
without the Ninth Amendment.  But the semantic content does a second 
thing.  Even if enumeration did not give rise to an implicature of exclu-
sivity, there could be a constitutional doctrine (legal content) that for-
bade judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights.  The reasoning in fa-
vor of such a rule of constitutional construction might have proceeded as 
follows: 
The Constitution enumerates a list of particular rights of the 
people.  This enumeration could give rise to an inference of exclu-
sivity or it could give rise to an opposing inference that other rele-
vantly similar rights are also protected.  This implicative ambiguity 
requires constitutional construction.  The better construction (for 
normative reasons that the reader can supply) is that the list is ex-
clusive.  Therefore, there should be a rule of constitutional doctrine 
that limits individual rights to those that are enumerated and those 
that result by logical implication from the enumerated rights. 
The semantic content of the Ninth Amendment forbids this construc-
tion50 (and also the interpretation already considered), and hence the 
Ninth Amendment is itself a rule of construction. 
Thus far we have focused on the semantic content of the Ninth 
Amendment, but most of the debate about the meaning of the Ninth 
concerns implicature and other forms of contextual enrichment.  Again 
consider the text: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple.”  The text does not state that the people do have retained rights.  
This can be demonstrated by adding the words “if any” to the text as fol-
lows: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others, if any, retained by the people.”  
                                                                                                                                      
 50. See id. at 533; see also Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 895, 929 (2008). 
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The “if any” does not create a logical contradiction.  For this same rea-
son, the semantic content of the text does not give rise to a constitutional 
implication that the people have retained rights—it is not logically re-
quired by the semantic content. 
But the Ninth Amendment does give rise to a straightforward con-
stitutional implicature that the people retain other rights.  The reasoning 
is simple.  There would be no reason for the Ninth Amendment if there 
were no rights retained by the people; given what the Ninth Amendment 
does say and the publicly available context of constitutional communica-
tion, a competent speaker of English would draw the implicature.  And 
hence the implicature is part of the communicative content of the Ninth 
Amendment.  Given the constraint principle, public meaning originalists 
ought not endorse constitutional doctrine that is inconsistent with the 
implicature—assuming that no defeasibility condition comes into play. 
Having gotten this far, there is a further question: what is the con-
tent of the retained rights?  Immediately, we see a problem.  The consti-
tutional implicature is that there are retained rights, but this implicature 
from the Ninth Amendment does not tell us what the content of the 
rights might be.  Of course, it is possible that the publicly available con-
text of constitutional communication provides sufficient information to 
give shape to that content.  For example, if that context included wide-
spread public agreement on a theory of natural rights such that compe-
tent speakers of American English immersed in the political culture 
would understand that “retained rights” were natural rights, then the 
publicly shared theory of natural rights might liquidate a substantial 
amount of the implicated vagueness.  Similarly, if the shared culture in-
cluded agreement on theories of popular sovereignty or of federalism, 
then one of those theories might similarly provide content to the implica-
ture.  Many of the debates about the meaning of the Ninth Amendment 
should be understood as debates about the content of the publicly avail-
able context of constitutional communication. 
Suppose, however, that the publicly available context included 
competing and only partially articulate views about natural rights, popu-
lar sovereignty, and federalism.  In that case, the content of the constitu-
tional implicature from the Ninth Amendment might be irreducibly am-
biguous.  Operationally, this would be the case if different competent 
speakers aware of the public context would draw different inferences 
about the content of the constitutional implicature or if a single reader 
would be undecided about the content of the implicature.  Such irreduci-
ble ambiguity requires constitutional construction. 
But that is not the end of the story.  It might be that the irreducible 
ambiguity is only partial.  Consider the following example: the First 
Amendment begins “Congress shall make no law” and hence one might 
conclude that the “freedom of speech” binds only Congress—leaving the 
executive and judicial branches unrestrained.  But the Ninth Amendment 
juxtaposed with the First Amendment and publicly available context of 
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constitutional communication may give rise to a constitutional implica-
ture that the freedom of speech also constrains action by the executive 
and judicial branches.  This is simply one example of a more general 
phenomenon—irreducible ambiguity in the content of constitutional im-
plicatures can be partial or total.  If it is partial, then the constraint prin-
ciple suggests that originalists should honor that portion of the implica-
ture that is unambiguous. 
D. Extratextual Constructions of Written Clauses 
Implicature and the Ninth Amendment are difficult both theoreti-
cally and practically, but there are much easier cases.  Some provisions of 
the Constitution have vague communicative content.  For example, the 
clauses that vest “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial power” may be 
vague in this way.51  Of course, vague semantic content may become rela-
tively more determinate once context is taken into account, but for many 
constitutional provisions, it seems likely that a substantial construction 
zone will remain after contextual enrichment. 
Different versions of originalism can embrace different theories of 
constitutional construction so long as those theories are consistent with 
the fixation thesis and the constraint principle—the unifying principles 
(or core) of originalism.  Some originalists may adopt theories of con-
struction that maximize the authority of the political branches; for exam-
ple, they might adopt a general rule of construction that calls for judges 
to defer to the political branches in the construction zone.52  Other 
originalists might look to the judicial practice of the founding era; the 
theory that is called “original methods originalism” could serve this pur-
pose.53  And another group of originalists might look to multiple modali-
ties of constitutional argument, including text, history, structure, prece-
dent, “ethos” of the American social order, and prudence.54  The content 
of any particular originalist theory of construction will depend on the 
underlying normative justification that theory gives for the constraint 
principle and a variety of other factors. 
                                                                                                                                      
 51. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1; id. art II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art III, § 1.  
 52. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233 (2012); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
857, 903 n.141 (2009); see also Solum, supra note 25.   
 53. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (ad-
vancing their theory as one of construction and not of interpretation); Solum, supra note 25. 
 54. The modalities approach is associated with Philipp Bobbitt, who is not an originalist.  See 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).  Whereas Bobbitt believes that all 
the modalities are relevant to constitutional interpretation (which he does not differentiate from con-
stitutional construction), an originalist might adapt Bobbitt’s approach as a theory of constitutional 
construction. See Solum, supra note 25.  Stephen Griffin’s pluralist approach to constitutional interpre-
tation is similar to Bobbitt’s modalities account.  See Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1753, 1753 (1994). 
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E. Holism and Structure 
In America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Amar suggests an ap-
proach to what he calls an “unwritten Constitution” and what I call ex-
tratextual sources of constitutional interpretation and construction.  Alt-
hough the primary focus of the book is on particularities, he does 
articulate a general method: 
A single methodological idea unifies all the foregoing case 
studies and hypotheticals.  On each topic, clause-bound literalism 
fails.  Sometimes the key clause in isolation is simply indeterminate.  
(The phrase “executive Power” can be read narrowly or broadly on 
the issue of presidential immunity from prosecution.) Other times, 
the most salient clause, in isolation, sends a rather misleading mes-
sage.  (The First Amendment speaks only of “Congress,” but surely 
presidents, federal courts, and states must also honor citizens’ rights 
to express political opinions.)  On occasion the Constitution’s true 
meaning is very nearly the opposite of what the applicable clause 
seems to say quite expressly.  (The vice president does not properly 
preside over his own impeachment.)  This Article’s unifying idea is 
that we must read the Constitution as a whole—between the lines, so 
to speak.55 
Let us use the name “constitutional holism” for the view that the 
meaning of the Constitution is the meaning of the whole document or the 
“holistic meaning.”56  What should originalists think about holism? 
Public-meaning originalists are committed to the public-meaning 
thesis.  The communicative content of the Constitution is a function of 
contextually enriched semantic content. But what if individual words and 
phrases cannot be understood in isolation because the Constitution is an 
organic whole?  For example, the phrase “rights . . .  retained by the 
People” in the Ninth Amendment might not be comprehensible without 
reference to “We the People” in the Preamble: are “the People” individ-
uals or are they a polity?  Likewise, the Ninth uses the phrase “the enu-
meration of certain rights in this Constitution.”  Gleaning the meaning of 
this phrase seems to require reference to what is now called “the Bill of 
Rights,” and once that has been accomplished, the meaning of the phrase 
“rights . . . retained by the People” may be clarified.  For example, the 
“retained rights” which are not to be denied or disparaged may be of the 
same type or kind as the “enumerated rights” such as the freedom of 
speech and press, the right to bear arms, the right to due process, and so 
forth. 
Does holistic meaning provide a better account of the communica-
tive content of the Constitution than does public meaning (as specified 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. AMAR, supra note 5, at 47 (emphasis added). 
 56. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Popu-
lism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1659 (1997) (observing “the importance of looking at the Constitu-
tion as a whole, because what was ratified was the document, not individual clauses” and “[t]he clause 
is not the unit, or at least the only unit of analysis”). 
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here)?  To get at this question, we first need to identify and then deflate 
a misleading picture of the relationship between the meaning of individ-
ual clauses and the whole Constitution.  It might be thought that there 
are only two alternative positions on the relationship of the whole to the 
parts when it comes to constitutional meaning. The first alternative might 
be called “clause-bound interpretivism,” which we can define as follows: 
The meaning of each clause must be determined from within the 
four corners of the clause. 
Akhil Amar suggests and rejects this alternative throughout the text 
of America’s Unwritten Constitution.57  We can now see that clause-
bound interpretivism is inconsistent with the public meaning thesis: the 
meaning of the Constitution for the public (at the time of framing and 
ratification) is a function of both semantic content and context.  So pub-
lic-meaning originalists should reject clause-bound interpretivism. 
This brings us to a second theory, which might be called “organic-
unity holism”: 
Meaning only attaches to the whole Constitution as an organic 
unity; as a consequence individual clauses are not meaningful units 
of constitutional communication.58 
This picture, which suggests we must choose between clause-bound in-
terpretivism and organic-unity holism, might be called the “all-or-
nothing picture”: either the Constitution’s meaning is all holistic (the 
whole Constitution all at once) or it is nothing holistic (no meaning at-
taches to the individual clauses by virtue of their relationship to the 
whole document). 
The all-or-nothing picture creates a false dilemma.  There is an al-
ternative picture of the relationship between the meaning of individual 
clauses and the whole Constitution: that picture can be expressed via two 
theoretical ideas: (1) the familiar device of the hermeneutic circle, and 
(2) the related notion of intratextualism. 
The idea of the hermeneutic circle figured prominently in 
Protestant theological hermeneutics as a method for understanding the 
relationship of the meaning of individual biblical passages to the whole 
text: “the meaning of each individual passage of scripture is gleaned in 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. See, e.g., AMAR supra note 5, at 47.  
 58. Organic unity holism resembles “semantic holism,” a position in the philosophy of language.  
Ned Block defines semantic holism as follows: 
Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of 
a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences compris-
ing a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and 
molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts 
of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For example, the 
meaning of ‘chase’ might be said by a molecularist to be try to catch. Atomism characterizes 
meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning 
or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs. 
Ned Block, Holism, Mental and Semantic, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (forthcoming 2013), 
available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/MentalSemanticHolism.html. 
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light of the meaning of the Bible as a whole.”59  As Gadamer puts it, “For 
the whole of Scripture guides the understanding of individual passages: 
and again this whole can be reached only through the cumulative under-
standing of individual passages.”60  Justice Story’s first recommendation 
for constitutional construction is based on the same notion: “In constru-
ing the constitution of the United States, we are, in the first instance, to 
consider, what are its nature and objects, its scope and design, as appar-
ent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also 
viewed in its component parts.”61 
Intratextualism62 as articulated by Akhil Amar expresses a closely 
related idea with a different metaphor: 
Textual argument as typically practiced today is blinkered 
(“clause-bound” in Ely’s terminology), focusing intently on the 
words of a given constitutional provision in splendid isolation.  By 
contrast, intratextualism always focuses on at least two clauses and 
highlights the link between them.  Clause-bound textualism para-
digmatically stresses what is explicit in the Constitution’s text: “See 
here, it says X!”  By contrast, intratextualism paradigmatically 
stresses what is only implicit in the Constitution’s text: “See here, 
these clauses fit together!”  But there is no clause in the Constitu-
tion that says, explicitly and in so many words, that the three Vest-
ing Clauses should be construed together, or that the Article III 
grant of federal question jurisdiction should be read alongside the 
Article VI Supremacy Clause.  Intratextualism simply reads the 
Constitution as if these implicit linking clauses existed.  Clause-
bound textualism reads the words of the Constitution in order, 
tracking the sequence of clauses as they appear in the document it-
self.  By contrast, intratextualism often reads the words of the Con-
stitution in a dramatically different order, placing textually nonad-
joining clauses side by side for careful analysis.  In effect, 
intratextualists read a two-dimensional parchment in a three-
dimensional way, carefully folding the parchment to bring scattered 
clauses alongside each other.63 
Both the idea of the hermeneutic circle and the idea of intratextualism 
undermine the all-or-nothing picture.  Our choices are not limited to 
clause-bound interpretivism and organic-unity holism.  The excluded 
middle is to read individual clauses in the context of the whole Constitu-
tion.  Public meaning originalism squarely occupies the excluded middle: 
it insists that the semantic content of individual clauses is enriched by the 
publicly available context, and the whole of the constitutional text is in-
                                                                                                                                      
 59. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism As Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1608 
(1989). 
 60. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 175 (1975) (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald 
G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1992). 
 61. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 136 
(abridged ed. 1833). 
 62. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 63. Id. at 788 (citations omitted). 
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disputably part of that!  Moreover, public meaning originalism endorses 
the idea that contextual enrichment may occur at the structural level, 
that is, the “structural features of the constitutional text.” 64  Once the all-
or-nothing picture is out of the way, it becomes apparent that contextual 
clause meaning can be reconciled with a plausible version of holistic 
meaning. 
One final point: organic unity holism is utterly implausible as a the-
ory of communicative content.  The whole Constitution is not the rele-
vant unit for determining communicative content.  It is no accident that 
when we apply the Constitution, our focus is on clauses, the interaction 
between clauses, and the structural features that form such interactions.  
The Constitution as an organic unity says both too much and too little.  
Too much, because the whole Constitution from top to bottom consid-
ered a single unit of meaning does not translate into rules of constitu-
tional law: organic unity holism makes the Constitution one long primal 
scream.  Too little, because organic unity prevents us from assigning 
meaning at the level of particularity required to do the work of constitu-
tional practice: organic unity holism transforms individual clauses into 
meaningless concatenations of phonemes. 
In sum, if holistic meaning is construed plausibly (as incorporating 
the ideas of the hermeneutic circle and intratextualism) then it is ab-
sorbed into public meaning originalism.  But if construed in accord with 
organic unity holism, holistic meaning is no meaning at all. 
Can originalists embrace modest holism?  Modest holism can play at 
least four distinct roles in constitutional interpretation and construction: 
1. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can re-
solve semantic ambiguities. 
2. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can re-
veal constitutional implications—the logical consequences of 
the interactions between various clauses. 
3. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can 
create or reveal contextual enrichment—in this regard the 
whole text acts as context for particular clauses, phrases, or 
words. 
4. Reading parts of the Constitution in light of the whole can 
guide constitutional construction; for example, the relation-
ship between the grants of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power in the first three Articles could guide construction of 
each. 
Originalists can and should endorse modest holism whenever it 
plays one of these four roles. 
                                                                                                                                      
 64. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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G. Extratextual Fundamental Law 
Extratextual sources can play yet another role—as freestanding 
sources of fundamental law.  The concept represented by the word “free-
standing” plays an important role here. We can begin to understand the 
notion of “freestanding fundamental law” by way of contrast with two 
other ideas: (1) the constitutional constructions that are bound to text 
and (2) contextual enrichment of the semantic content of the text.  Con-
structions that are bound to the text are not freestanding—they are at-
tached to text that is vague or irreducibly ambiguous.  Contextual en-
richments (e.g., constitutional implicatures) provide the communicative 
content of the text in context; they do not stand free from the text. 
But we can imagine constitutional doctrine that is derived from 
freestanding sources.  For example, one might believe that fundamental 
principles of political morality operate directly to create constitutional 
doctrine.  The strongest version of this idea would give these principles 
of political morality trumping force—they would have legal force even if 
directly contrary to the text of the Constitution.  Consider an example: 
slavery and the slave trade both violate fundamental principles of politi-
cal morality, but the text of the Constitution arguably prohibited Con-
gress from outlawing the slave trade.65  A more modest version would al-
low for fundamental law that supplements but does not contradict the 
constitutional text.  For example, one might believe that there is a princi-
ple of political morality that is the source of a constitutional rule forbid-
ding capital punishment—even though the communicative content of the 
Constitution does not contain or imply such a rule.66 
We have already discussed the Ninth Amendment.  Although the 
Amendment itself does not directly or logically imply or state that extra-
textual fundamental law is judicially enforceable, it might be that the 
Ninth Amendment creates a constitutional implicature to that effect.  
That argument would not be “freestanding” in the sense in which that 
term is used here.  For the sake of argument, we need to assume that nei-
ther the Ninth Amendment nor any other textual source provides a tex-
tual basis for the incorporation of extratextual fundamental law. 
What should be the stance of originalism toward extratextual fun-
damental law as a freestanding source of constitutional law?  The con-
straint principle suggests that the strong version of the idea of extratex-
tual fundamental law is inconsistent with originalism.  But what about 
the modest version?  One tempting answer implicitly invokes the idea 
that the Constitution is an integrated writing, but where would that prin-
                                                                                                                                      
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not ex-
ceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). 
 66. Of course, some opponents of capital punishment could argue that a rule forbidding the 
death penalty can be derived from the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.  The argument in text 
is based on the assumption that this derivation does not work. 
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ciple come from?  It is not stated in the constitutional text nor is it logi-
cally implied by the text.67  Putting the Ninth Amendment to the side, the 
text takes no position on extratextual fundamental law. 
Of course, many originalists will believe that extratextual funda-
mental law is obviously contrary to the normative basis for the constraint 
principle.  For example, if one affirms the constraint principle because 
one believes that judges are untrustworthy and hence should be con-
strained by the constitutional text, one will be likely to adopt a rule that 
prohibits judicial recognition and enforcement of extratextual fundamen-
tal law.  But this rule itself is not stated in the text.  It might be a con-
struction derived from the phrase “judicial power” or it might itself be 
derived from a freestanding principle of political morality. 
On the other hand, if one’s justification for the constraint principle 
were based on a theory of natural rights combined with an argument that 
public meaning originalism provided for the best institutional structure 
for the protection of such rights, then one might believe that a natural-
rights version of extratextual fundamental law is consistent with original-
ism. 
The word “originalism” is a neologism, coined by Paul Brest to de-
scribe a constitutional theory that he opposed.68  Some originalists may 
believe that the spirit of originalism is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the notion of freestanding extratextual fundamental law, and hence free-
standing extratextual fundamental law should not be called “originalist.”  
Other originalists may insist, with equal fervor, that natural-rights extra-
textual fundamental law is at the core of the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  Once we recognize that “originalism” is a stipulated theory 
term, it becomes clear that there is no truth of the matter in this debate.  
The best we can do is to be clear about the meaning of our stipulated 
theoretical language.  My own view is that any constitutional theory that 
affirms the fixation thesis and the constraint principle is properly called 
“originalist,” given the patterns of self-identification of contemporary 
constitutional theorists who endorse originalism.  The disputes about 
freestanding unenumerated constitutional rights reflect dispute among 
originalists about the correct formulation of the constraint principle. 
G. Enactment Arguments 
One of the most interesting contributions made by Akhil Amar in 
America’s Unwritten Constitution is his proposal for a distinctive form of 
contextual enrichment.  In this section, we shall investigate Amar’s pro-
posal from the perspective of public meaning originalism.  Should 
originalists embrace Amarian enactment arguments? 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. This can easily be demonstrated.  Add an extratextual fundamental law clause to the consti-
tution.  The new provision does not contradict or invalidate any of the communicative content of the 
constitutional text.  It follows that the negation of the imaginary provision is not implied by the com-
municative content of the actual text. 
 68. See SOLUM, supra note 17, at 13. 
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We can begin our investigation with an explication of Amar’s 
statement of his argument.  Amar focuses on the ratification process as 
the basis for constitutional implicature.  He calls this kind of argument 
from extratextual sources “argument from enactment” or “enactment ar-
gument.”69  Here is Amar’s description: 
In the fateful year following the unveiling of the Philadelphia 
delegates’ proposed Constitution in September 1787, specially 
elected ratifying conventions across the continent enacted the pro-
posal into law, much as the houses of an ordinary legislature might 
enact a statute.  The specific enacting procedures and protocols that 
brought forth the Constitution are rich with meaning.  They invite 
interpretation. 
The sort of interpretation I have in mind here is not interpre-
tation of what the Constitution says as a text, explicitly or implicitly.  
Rather, it is the interpretation of how the Constitution became 
law.70 
In particular, Amar argues that the enactment both provides an inde-
pendent ground for the freedom of speech and provides that right with 
content.  His explanation provides further clarity: 
The claim is not that free speech generally prevailed on the 
ground in postcolonial America. . . . Rather, the special twist is that 
the very act of constitutional ordainment itself occurred in and 
through a regime of boisterous, virtually uncensored free speech.  
In this respect, the argument from enactment history functions like 
a standard textual argument, which also focuses tightly on the Con-
stitution itself.  But the enactment approach understands the Pre-
amble’s self-reference to “this Constitution” as a deed as well as a 
text—a doing, an ordainment, a constituting, a performative utter-
ance.  In short, an enactment, reflected in the text itself: “We the 
People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution.”71 
And he provides another gloss in an adjacent passage: 
To put the point a slightly different way, an enactment argu-
ment can perhaps be seen as a textual argument of sorts—an inter-
pretation of the tiny but powerful workhouse word “do” in the Pre-
amble.  The argument from enactment prompts us to understand 
what was in fact done by the people in the very process of ordaining 
and establishing the Constitution.  And what was done . . . was a 
remarkable embodiment of free speech, speech that was inextrica-
bly intertwined with the very deed of ordainment itself.72 
And in another passage, Amar identifies yet another characteristic 
of enactment arguments: 
Enactment arguments also share one of the great strengths of 
various classical arguments derived from the Constitution’s general 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. AMAR, supra note 5, at 54. 
 70. Id. at 51. 
 71. Id. at 55. 
 72. Id. 
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structure: a focus on the Constitution as a whole rather than on 
some small clause or part.  Whereas many standard textual argu-
ments are small-bore and clause-bound, enactment arguments are 
panoramic, drawing out attention to how the entire Constitution 
came into being.  In this sense, an enactment argument is the ulti-
mate structural argument, with a historical twist.73 
Finally, he integrates the ideas in the three above-quoted passage as 
follows: “Howsoever we classify enactment arguments—whether we view 
them as historical, or textual, or structural—we need to see that the writ-
ten Constitution and the unwritten Constitution cohere to form a single 
system.”74 
The final passage sheds light on the preceding three, suggesting that 
Amar sees three possible understandings of enactment arguments, we 
can label them as follows (1) “the historical understanding,” (2) “the tex-
tual understanding,” and (3) “the structural understanding.” 
These passages are highly suggestive, but they do not make the the-
oretical structure of enactment arguments transparent. How precisely 
does the enactment argument work?  In the case of freedom of speech, 
the general idea seems to be that the enactment process displayed a con-
ception of the freedom of speech, and therefore the freedom of speech is 
(or should be) part of the legal content of constitutional doctrine.  Stated 
in this way, the argument is enthymematic: the missing premise would 
provide a warrant for moving from the fact that ratification of the Consti-
tution was conducted under conditions of free speech to the conclusion 
that those conditions (or the conception that best fits them) have legal 
force. 
What is the missing premise?  Consider first the textualist under-
standing of the enactment argument.  Viewed as a textual argument fo-
cused on the word “do” in the Preamble of the Constitution, the enact-
ment argument does not go through.  Amar correctly observes that the 
Preamble uses the word “do” in “We the People . . . do ordain and estab-
lish this Constitution” and that it plays a performative function.  Implicit-
ly, Amar is referring to speech-act theory, elegantly introduced by J.L. 
Austin’s classic, How to Do Things with Words.75  Austin’s key insight is 
that utterances have what is called “illocutionary force”—they can make 
promises, issue commands, reject an offer, and so forth.76  The Preamble, 
when read in conjunction with the ratification provisions of Article VII,77 
may constitute an illocutionary act: upon ratification, “We the People” 
perform an action, ordaining and establishing this Constitution.  The in-
                                                                                                                                      
 73. Id. at 55–56. 
 74. Id. at 56. 
 75. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 
1975). 
 76. Id. at 100.  
 77. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient 
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”). 
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dexical “this”78 (which appears in both the Preamble and Article VII) 
makes it clear that ratification ordains and establishes the Constitution 
contained in the text in which the Preamble and Article VII appear—the 
text contained in the document that was produced at the Philadelphia 
Convention and that is now displayed in the National Archives. 
Is there a textualist argument for a particular conception of the 
freedom of speech based on the meaning of the word “do” or the speech 
act of ordaining and establishing the Constitution of 1789?  Of course, the 
contribution of the word “do” to the semantic content of the Constitu-
tion does not include a conception of the freedom of speech—and Amar 
could not be charitably interpreted to make a claim that it does.  “Do” 
does make a contribution to the semantic content of the Constitution: 
“do” connects the illocutionary action of ordaining and establishing to an 
agent, “We the People.”  But this semantic contribution does not include 
a conception of the freedom of speech: the semantic content of the word 
“do” is both too sparse and too far in conceptual space from freedom of 
speech to play this role. 
What about the speech act of ordaining and establishing the Consti-
tution of 1789?  A full account of the illocutionary force of this act would 
be complex and is outside the scope of this Essay.  Nonetheless, we can 
reach some obvious conclusions about the content of the illocutionary 
force.  The text of both the Preamble and Article VII clearly refer to 
“this Constitution.”  As Christopher Green has argued, this use of the 
indexical strongly suggests that it is the text of the Constitution of 1789 
that was ordained and established.79  If Green is correct, then the textual-
ist understanding of the enactment argument does not support the free-
dom of speech—unless the freedom of speech can be located in the text 
itself.  We can bracket the question of whether there is a freedom of 
speech in the communicative content of the text of the Constitution of 
1789.  The crucial point is that the communicative content of the text is 
not the entire ratification process.  The text is one thing; the ratification 
process is another.  The text has semantic content; the conception of 
freedom of speech displayed by the ratification process does not have 
semantic content, although the process can be described in language that 
does have such content. 
One might argue that the Preamble does ordain and establish Arti-
cle VII, but Article VII itself does not include a conception of the free-
dom of speech.  I will develop the argument in full, but it seems clear that 
the freedom of speech is not part of the semantic content of “The Ratifi-
cation of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Estab-
lishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”80  
One might try to argue that a conception of the freedom of speech is 
                                                                                                                                      
 78. See generally Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis 
for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009) (using indexicals to argue the 
meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the Founding). 
 79. Id. at 1660. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art VII. 
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built into notion of a “convention” or “ratification,” but this proposal 
seems unlikely to succeed.  One way to see this is to imagine a variation 
of Article VII that disclaimed such an effect: “The Ratification of the 
Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of 
this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.  The legisla-
ture of each state shall provide such rules regarding the deliberations of 
such conventions as it deems fit.”  The revised version of Article VII is 
not nonsensical, as it would be if the semantic content of “convention” 
included the freedom of speech. 
Because Amar’s explicit statement of the textualist understanding 
of the enactment argument is very brief, it is possible that Amar might 
attempt to connect the word “do” to a conception of the freedom of 
speech in some other way.  The discussion in the preceding paragraph 
shows that such a conception is not to be found in the semantic content 
of the Preamble or the illocutionary force of the speech act of ordaining 
and establishing the Constitution of 1789. 
Amar offers two other understandings of the idea of an enactment 
argument, which he calls “structural” and “historical.”81  Again, Amar’s 
explication is brief and fragmentary, but what he does say suggests that 
both of these understandings are contextual enrichment arguments.  As 
we have already seen, the structure of the Constitution forms an im-
portant part of the context of individual clauses.  Modest holism, which 
embraces the idea of the hermeneutic circle and intratextualism, identi-
fies the distinctive modalities of structural arguments.82 
Can enactment arguments be understood as structural in the sense 
specified by modest holism?  Here, Amar’s move is to argue that the rati-
fication process is part of the Constitution.  What does that claim mean?  
Amar cannot be charitably construed as claiming that the ratification 
process is part of the constitutional text.  To begin, the ratification pro-
cess is not a text, although it includes texts.  The various writings and ut-
terances that are part of the process are not part of the constitutional 
text.  Is there an alternative interpretation of Amar’s claim that the rati-
fication process is part of the text?  The most plausible alternative is con-
textual.  That is, we can understand Amar’s structural argument as claim-
ing that the ratification process is part of the publicly available context of 
constitutional communication, and hence that ratification can be a source 
of contextual enrichment. 
This interpretation of the structural understanding of the enactment 
argument can be applied to the historical understanding as well.  The rat-
ification process is part of the historical context of the constitutional text.  
From an originalist perspective, history is relevant for two reasons: (1) it 
provides linguistic facts relevant to the determination of semantic con-
tent, and (2) some historical facts are part of the publicly available con-
text.  The historical understanding of the enactment argument can be re-
                                                                                                                                      
 81. See AMAR, supra note 5, at 56. 
 82. See supra Part IV.D. 
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constructed as an argument about publicly available context.  Of course, 
not all of the ratification process was available to the American people in 
general.  Some parts of the process were behind the scenes and not pub-
licly accessible at all.  Some events occurred in meetings that were only 
accessible to the participants and those to whom they reported in oral 
conversations or private letters.  But some of the events surrounding rati-
fication were widely reported and hence publicly available.  Let us as-
sume that the “regime of boisterous, virtually uncensored free speech”83 
reported by Amar satisfies the conditions for inclusion in the publicly 
available context of constitutional utterance. 
We can now summarize our progress in unpacking Amar’s enact-
ment argument.  Although the argument might be interpreted as making 
a claim about the semantic content of the Constitution or about the con-
tent of the illocutionary force of the speech act of ordaining and establish-
ing the Constitution of 1789, these interpretations are neither charitable 
to Amar nor plausible.  The best interpretation of the textual, structural, 
and historical understandings of the enactment argument is contextual.  
Parts of the ratification process are included in the publicly available 
context of constitutional communication, and hence are eligible sources 
for contextual enrichment. 
Understood in this way, Amar’s enactment argument remains en-
thymematic.  For the argument to be complete, Amar would need to 
spell out the specific mechanism by which public awareness of the ratifi-
cation process created communicative content including the freedom of 
speech.  One can imagine various ways the argument might go.  Amar 
might argue for a constitutional implicature: robust freedom of speech 
during the ratification process implicates an unstated principle of free-
dom of speech that should guide construction of the power grants in the 
first three Articles of the constitutional text.  Or Amar might make an 
argument that the ratification process implicitly precisifies vague or 
open-textured provisions; perhaps the vague and possibly ambiguous 
word “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause.  There may be other 
possibilities as well.  Because Amar’s statement of the argument is in-
complete, it is difficult to assess its validity from an originalist perspec-
tive. 
The question addressed here is whether originalists can accept en-
actment arguments as a type—whatever the merits of the particular ar-
gument tokens advanced by Amar in America’s Unwritten Constitution.  
If the enactment argument is understood as a form of contextual enrich-
ment, then originalists can embrace it; contextual enrichment is a para-
digmatic form of originalist argument, precisely because context is one of 
the sources of original meaning (understood as communicative content).  
Understood in this way, Amar’s contribution is identification of a partic-
ular type of contextual enrichment—based on the characteristics of the 
process of ratification.  Originalists should have no quarrel with the 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. AMAR, supra note 5, at 55. 
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type—although Amar’s particular arguments (e.g., his free speech argu-
ment) could be contested on their merits (once they were fully specified). 
H. Nonconstitutional Texts 
Should originalists embrace arguments that use nonconstitutional 
texts as sources of constitutional doctrine?  For example, should original-
ists embrace arguments that derive the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine from the Declaration of Independence, the Treaty of York, 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, or the Federalist Papers?  Various versions 
of these questions have been the subject of vigorous debate.  For exam-
ple, Lee Strang has argued that the Declaration of Independence should 
not be viewed as an independent source of constitutional norms,84 but 
others, such as Scott Gerber, have argued that the Declaration should 
play a robust role.85  For the purposes of this discussion, a “nonconstitu-
tional text” is any text that is not part of the United States Constitution—
the Constitution of 1789 plus all of the subsequent amendments; roughly, 
the version of the Constitution in the United States Code. 
Akhil Amar has argued generally for a robust role for extraconstitu-
tional texts, which he treats as part of America’s “symbolic constitution”: 
America’s symbolic constitution surely includes (but is not limited 
to) the Declaration of Independence, Publius’s The Federalist, the 
Northwest Ordinance, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, the Warren 
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board, and Dr. King’s “I Have a 
Dream speech.” 
These works set forth background principles that powerfully 
inform American constitutional interpretation.  Wherever the writ-
ten Constitution is fairly susceptible to different interpretations, in-
terpreters should hesitate, and do in fact hesitate, to embrace any 
reading that would violate the clear letter and spirit of these other 
canonical texts.  In short, these texts are constitutional in the sense 
that they are constitutive—adherence to these texts helps constitute 
Americans as a distinct people among all the peoples of the earth.86 
There is much going on in this passage; examining Amar’s case for 
nonconstitutional texts as sources of constitutional law can help us to un-
tangle the various roles such texts might play. 
Once again, our question is how nonconstitutional texts should be 
viewed from an originalist perspective.  We can begin with an easy case 
for public-meaning originalists.  Some nonconstitutional texts are clearly 
part of the publicly available context of constitutional communication.  
Such documents include The Federalist Papers and the Declaration of 
Independence.  Because they are part of the publicly available context, 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique 
Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006). 
 85. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3 (1995). 
 86. AMAR, supra note 5, at 247. 
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they can play a role in arguments for contextual enrichment of the se-
mantic content of the constitutional text.  Such enrichments might in-
clude the clarification of ambiguity, constitutional implicatures, or argu-
ments about implicit content. 
Originalists should embrace another role for nonconstitutional 
texts.  The semantic component of original meaning is fixed by linguistic 
facts as they stood at the time each provision of the Constitution was 
framed and ratified.  Linguistic facts are established or known on the ba-
sis of evidence.  In the case of very recent amendments, there may be au-
dio recordings that could be the source of evidence about relevant lin-
guistic facts, but for the Constitution of 1789 and most of the 
amendments, the relevant linguistic evidence will be provided by non-
constitutional texts—including publicly available documents like The 
Federalist Papers, but also including nonpublic documents like diaries, 
private letters, and even the nonpublic records of the Philadelphia Con-
vention. 
There is a third role for nonconstitutional texts that some original-
ists may embrace.  Nonconstitutional texts might serve as evidence of 
what Philip Bobbitt calls “ethos,” the shared values of the American 
people.87  Some constitutional theorists may believe that such values 
trump the communicative content of the constitutional text, but the con-
straint principle commits originalists to the view that ethos can play only 
a supplementary role.  Deploying the terminology of the interpretation-
construction distinction, ethos (as evidenced by canonical nonconstitu-
tional texts) could guide constitutional actors in the construction zone—
but would have no direct relevance to constitutional interpretation.  This 
view is close to that expressed by Amar, who writes, “True, these special 
texts are not on the same legal level as the written Constitution itself.  
Where the terse text is clear, it trumps.  But often the written Constitu-
tion is not crystal clear.”88  To be clear, different originalists have differ-
ent views about constitutional construction and the constraint principle: 
some originalists may reject the idea that substantive values can play a 
role in the construction zone; for example, originalists might adopt a 
Thayerian rule of construction, deferring to elected officials when the 
communicative content of the constitutional text is vague or irreducibly 
ambiguous.89 
In sum, originalists can embrace three roles for nonconstitutional 
texts: (1) if the text is part of the publicly available context of constitu-
tional communication, the text can serve as the part of the basis for con-
textual enrichment; (2) if the text is contemporaneous with the framing 
and ratifying of a particular provision, the text can provide evidence of 
linguistic facts that determine semantic content; and (3) if the text pro-
                                                                                                                                      
 87. BOBBITT, supra note 54, at 12–13. 
 88. AMAR, supra note 5, at 247–48. 
 89. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25–26 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1893). 
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vides evidence of norms relevant to constitutional construction, the text 
may guide the development of constitutional doctrine in the construction 
zone. 
There is a fourth role for nonconstitutional texts.  Some of these 
texts, such as the Declaration of Independence or the Treaty of Paris, 
could arguably be part of the Constitution.  The conventional wisdom in 
constitutional theory is that the text is limited to the Constitution of 1789 
and the canonical set of amendments recognized in the United States 
Code.  Analogizing with the Bible, we can label the disputed texts “con-
stitutional apocrypha.”90  How should originalists view constitutional 
apocrypha?  Originalists, like other constitutional theorists, will need to 
answer the question of canonicity: are the apocrypha properly viewed as 
part of the constitutional canon?  The question whether a particular text 
in the aporcypha should be moved into the canon is complex, and outside 
the scope of this essay.  My guess is that very few originalists will accept 
expansion of the constitutional canon.  If a particular text were moved 
into the canon, then originalists will insist that the (once apocryphal, now 
canonical) text be interpreted in light of the fixation thesis: the meaning 
of the Declaration of Independence or the Treaty of Paris was fixed at 
the time these documents were written.  And if they are canonical, then 
the constraint principle would apply: constitutional doctrine should (at a 
minimum) be consistent with their communicative content. 
I. Precedent 
What role should precedent (or judicial opinion) play in constitu-
tional practice? 
In particular, how should originalism treat precedent?  This is a 
large topic on which much has been written.91  One useful way into the 
problem is via the interpretation-construction distinction.  Interpretation 
seeks the linguistic meaning of the text.  Construction determines the le-
gal content of constitutional doctrine and the effect of that content in 
particular cases. 
What about precedent and constitutional interpretation?  Original-
ists are committed to the fixation thesis: the communicative content of 
the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and 
ratified.  Public-meaning originalists believe that the communicative con-
tent is a function of the conventional semantic meaning of the text and 
                                                                                                                                      
 90. See THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED APOCRYPHA: NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION (Mi-
chael D. Coogan, et al. eds., 2010). 
 91. Originalist writing on this topic includes Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Origi-
nal Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, 
Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Fu-
ture of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 159 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theo-
ry of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 
(2006). 
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contextual enrichment (by the publicly available context of constitutional 
communication).  On the surface, these commitments might lead to the 
conclusion that precedent should have no effect on constitutional inter-
pretation.  If a constitutional precedent correctly identifies and applies 
original meaning, then it is redundant.  And if a constitutional precedent 
departs from original meaning, then the constraint principle would seem 
to require originalists to disregard the precedent. 
Akhil Amar has concisely expressed the originalist worry about 
precedent that departs from original meaning: 
If the justices generally felt free (or obliged!) to follow clearly 
erroneous case law concerning the core meaning of the Constitu-
tion, then the foundational document might ultimately be wholly 
eclipsed.  Rather than simply filling the document’s gaps, judicial 
doctrine would erase its outlines.  If the written Constitution indeed 
contemplated this odd result, one would expect to see a rather clear 
statement to that effect: “This Constitution may be wholly super-
seded by conceded judicial misinterpretation; all branches are oath-
bound to follow these misinterpretations.”  But the Constitution 
says nothing of the sort.  On the contrary, it explicitly and self-
referentially obliges all officials to swear oaths to itself, not to con-
ceded misinterpretations of it.92 
But this simple picture is misleading.  A regime of constitutional in-
terpretation must answer at least two distinct questions.  The first ques-
tion addresses the substantive content of constitutional meaning; public-
meaning originalism has a distinctive answer to this question.  The sec-
ond question concerns the institutional structure by which constitutional 
meaning is determined and implemented. 
A fully developed version of originalist constitutional practice must 
address the second question—specifying which institutions are responsi-
ble for determining original meaning and how these interactions will 
structure the activity of constitutional interpretation.  One institutional 
possibility would be polycentric constitutional interpretation: each indi-
vidual official could make independent judgments about constitutional 
meaning.  The most extreme version of a polycentric regime would be 
radically different than the status quo.  For example, there would be nei-
ther horizontal nor vertical stare decisis: each judge would make inde-
pendent judgments about the meaning of the Constitution.  In a purely 
polycentric regime, executive and legislative officials would have similar 
interpretive authority—in the extreme case, disregarding coercive judi-
cial orders that were inconsistent with their individual constitutional 
judgments. 
But polycentric constitutional interpretation is not the only possible 
originalist regime.  For example, originalists might adopt the status quo 
practice that gives the United States Supreme Court the final word on 
questions of federal constitutional law—unless the political question doc-
                                                                                                                                      
 92. AMAR, supra note 5, at 237. 
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trine applies.  This practice would require lower court judges and other 
officials to defer to the Court on questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion—even if they believed that the Court had erred.  Similarly, the cur-
rent Supreme Court could defer to its prior self; adopting the doctrine of 
horizontal stare decisis to structure constitutional interpretation.  So long 
as this institutional structure is consistent with the original meaning of 
the Constitution, this option is available to originalists.  Whether it is the 
best option depends on a variety of complex institutional questions—
effects on stability, efficacy in maintaining original meaning, and so forth. 
Precedent might also play a role in constitutional construction.  For 
originalists who embrace the construction zone, nonoriginalist considera-
tions inevitably play a role in constitutional practice when the communi-
cative content of the constitutional text is vague or irreducibly ambigu-
ous.  In the construction zone, both vertical and horizontal stare decisis 
could structure constitutional doctrine—by definition the construction 
zone is the space in which the original meaning of the Constitution un-
derdetermines the legal content of constitutional doctrine. 
It should be uncontroversial that originalists can embrace an institu-
tional role for precedent—so long as that role is consistent with the con-
straint principle.  There is, however, a question about the proper role of 
precedent that is bound to be controversial.  Can originalists accept prec-
edents that are both (1) contrary to original meaning, and (2) decided on 
the basis of nonoriginalist concerns?  Although some originalists have 
argued that Brown v. Board can be justified on originalist grounds,93 sup-
pose that Brown is inconsistent with original meaning and that the opin-
ion in Brown cannot be fairly read as a good-faith attempt to reach a de-
cision consistent with original meaning.  Under these circumstances, 
would originalists be compelled to argue that Brown should be reversed?  
Or consider the New Deal-era precedents that expanded national legisla-
tive power and provided the constitutional foundations for the exercise 
of legislative, executive, and judicial powers by administrative agencies.94  
Assuming that these decisions are inconsistent with original meaning and 
that their reasoning cannot be characterized as a good-faith attempt to 
respect original meaning, must originalists argue that they should be 
overruled? 
Justice Scalia has argued for “faint-hearted originalism”—which 
reconciles originalism with nonoriginalist precedents on pragmatic 
grounds.95  Randy Barnett has forcefully criticized Scalia’s argument.96  
This theoretical disagreement can be characterized in terms of the con-
straint principle.  Originalists differ about the precise contours of the 
constraint principle.  Some, like Scalia, adopt versions of the constraint 
                                                                                                                                      
 93. See  Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (1996). 
 94. See. e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 95. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989). 
 96. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. L. 
REV. 7, 24 (2006). 
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principle with defeasibility conditions that are broad in scope.  Others, 
like Barnett, believe in relatively narrow defeasibility conditions—
although every originalist is likely to accept that original meaning must 
give way in some cases: the Constitution is not a suicide pact.97  When de-
feasibility conditions come into play, the resulting doctrines are constitu-
tional constructions: legal content of constitutional doctrine that is incon-
sistent with the communicative content of the constitutional text.  The 
question whether originalists should adopt broad or narrow defeasibility 
conditions is a complex one: the answer depends on the underlying justi-
fications for originalism, broader issues in political philosophy, and em-
pirical questions about institutional design.  These topics are important, 
but they cannot be resolved on this occasion and are likely to be the sub-
ject of ongoing dispute among originalists. 
J. Historical Practice 
The final category of extratextual sources of constitutional law to be 
examined here is historical practice by the political branches.  How 
should originalists treat constitutional arguments based on the institu-
tional practices of the President and Congress?  Should such practices 
have special authority if they were close in time to the adoption of a par-
ticular constitutional provision?  For example, should the actions of the 
first Congress and George Washington have special authority with re-
spect to interpretation and construction of the Constitution of 1789?  
These questions can be made more precise by distinguishing the role of 
historical practice in interpretation and construction. 
Consider first the role of historical practice in constitutional inter-
pretation.  In the sense stipulated by the interpretation-construction dis-
tinction, interpretation aims to recover the communicative content of the 
constitutional text.  Direct evidence of communicative content comes 
from two sources: (1) evidence of linguistic facts that establish conven-
tional semantic meaning, syntax, and grammar, and (2) historical evi-
dence of the publicly available context of constitutional communication.  
Post-ratification practice by the executive and legislative branches do not 
provide direct evidence.  Such practices are not linguistic facts.  And 
post-ratification practice cannot be part of the publicly available context 
of communication—because such practices occur after the communica-
tive acts (framing and ratification) have occurred. 
Nonetheless, historical practice can provide indirect evidence of 
original meaning.  Suppose that known linguistic facts underdetermine 
the meaning of a constitutional provision.  A typical case of such under-
determinacy might be ambiguity.  A word or phrase in the Constitution 
could have two (or more) semantic meanings.  The first Congress legis-
lates in a way that is consistent with one of the alternatives, but not the 
other.  One might infer that Congress’s action provides evidence in favor 
                                                                                                                                      
 97. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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of the interpretation that is consistent with the constitutionality of the 
legislation.  Of course, this evidence is not decisive—after all Congress 
(even the first Congress with members who attended the Philadelphia 
Convention and various ratifying conventions) could be mistaken—or 
Congress could have failed to recognize the issue or deliberately violated 
the Constitution.  Nonetheless, early historical practice provides evi-
dence relevant to the resolution of the ambiguity. 
How should originalists regard the use of historical practice in con-
stitutional construction?  Originalists are committed to the constraint 
principle.  When the meaning of the text is clear and relevant, originalists 
will adopt a construction that aligns the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine with the communicative content of the constitutional text.  But 
in the construction zone, there may be more than one constitutional doc-
trine permitted by a vague or irreducibly ambiguous text.  So originalists 
can accept the use of historical practice to liquidate constitutional mean-
ing in the construction zone.  Akhil Amar expresses this idea eloquently, 
using the phrase “institutional practice” to express the idea we have been 
considering using the similar phrase “historical practice”: 
First, institutional practice routinely goes beyond the written 
Constitution.  Second, institutional practice rarely goes against the 
canonical document.  Typically, the foundational text significantly 
constrains even if it does not exclusively control. 
In general, the underspecified text and the more specific insti-
tutional practices cohere to form a single system of daily govern-
ance in which the practices gloss and clarify the text, inducing inter-
preters to read the otherwise indeterminate text in a highly 
determinate way.  On a broad set of topics concerning the interac-
tions and internal operations of governmental entities, post-1789 in-
stitutional practice thus furnishes a powerful lens through which to 
read the 1789 blueprint.98 
Amar expresses himself in a slightly different vocabulary than we have 
employed.  He uses the word “indeterminate” to express the concept we 
have labeled “underdetermination.”  Amar doesn’t employ the interpre-
tation-construction distinction, but his terms “gloss” and “clarify” are 
consistent with the distinction between interpretation and construction. 
Originalists can embrace a role for historical practice in constitu-
tional construction.  Should they do so?  Once again, this is a complex 
question and different originalists may approach it differently.  Original-
ists whose normative concerns focus on the rule of law and judicial con-
straint may welcome historical practice arguments—as they provide a ba-
sis for settling constitutional questions.  Settlement serves the rule of law 
values of stability, certainty, and predictability.  Settlement also serves 
the function of constraining judges, by providing a basis for decision that 
does not require judges to make first-order normative judgments about 
the political morality of the settled institutional arrangements.  Other 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. AMAR, supra note 5, at 335. 
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originalists may argue that historical practices should play a modest role 
because they envision a greater role for normative concerns in the con-
struction zone.  And yet other originalists may believe that judges should 
generally defer to the political branches in the construction zone; these 
originalists may believe that the normative force of historical practice 
should be assessed by the political branches and hence that Congress or 
the President may depart from such practices without judicial interfer-
ence. 
V. A CASE STUDY: CAN VICE PRESIDENTS PRESIDE AT THEIR OWN 
TRIAL BY THE SENATE? 
In America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Amar explores a hypo-
thetical case that raises a series of problems for originalism’s commit-
ment to the constitutional text.  He posits an impeachment and trial of 
Andrew Johnson for high crimes and misdemeanors in 1865, when John-
son was Vice President of the United States.  Could Johnson have insist-
ed that he should serve as the President of the Senate and hence preside 
at his own trial?  Amar suggests that this result is required by the written 
Constitution, but that it is clear that the correct constitutional result 
would disqualify the President of the Senate from serving in this role.99  If 
Amar is correct about the implications of the text and the proper rule of 
constitutional law, his hypothetical poses a particular problem for 
originalists.  Originalists are committed to the constraint principle.  If 
that principle requires that the Vice President be permitted to serve as 
presiding officer in his own trial, but that outcome is clearly unconstitu-
tional, then the constraint principle is wrong.  We might then draw the 
conclusion that the constraint principle must be modified to take into ac-
count an “unwritten constitution”—or to use our preferred terminology, 
that extratextual sources should, in some cases, give rise to constitutional 
doctrines that are inconsistent with the communicative content of the 
constitutional text. 
Section Three of Article One of the Constitution provides: 
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. 
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a Presi-
dent pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he 
shall exercise the Office of President of the United States. 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. 
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirma-
tion. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief 
Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the 
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.100 
Section Five of Article One provides: 
                                                                                                                                      
 99. Id. at 6–19. 
 100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its 
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of 
two thirds, expel a Member.101 
The conjunction of the semantic content of these three provisions 
seems to suggest that the Vice President should preside in the case of a 
trial by the Senate upon his own impeachment by the House of Repre-
sentatives.  The Vice President is the President of the Senate.  The Sen-
ate has the power to try impeachments.  The Vice President is not dis-
qualified from serving as President of the Senate during a trial for 
impeachment.  Therefore, the Vice President is constitutionally entitled 
to preside at his own trial. 
Despite the plausibility of this argument, it not actually the case that 
the semantic content of Constitution commands this result.  First, the 
Constitution does not specify the rights and duties of the Vice President 
in his capacity as President of the Senate—with one exception, that he 
may only vote if the Senate is equally divided.  If an impeachment trial 
resulted in an equally divided vote, the Vice President would not be con-
victed and hence his tie-breaking vote would not be necessary or of legal 
effect.  It might be argued that the semantic content of the word “Presi-
dent” contains the power to preside at trials for impeachment, but this 
argument is implausible.  The very fact that the Constitution specifies the 
Vice President’s voting rights demonstrates that “President” is an elastic 
term.  The rights and powers of the President of the Senate could be con-
figured in a variety of ways—so long as the presidency contained a suffi-
cient bundle of rights and powers as to be recognizably presidential in 
character.  No one thinks that the “President” of Israel is not a “Presi-
dent” because he does not have the same panoply of powers as does the 
“President” of the United States.  Of course, it is possible that we might 
discover linguistic facts that specified presiding over “trial in cases of im-
peachment” as an essential component of the concept of a presidency, 
but this possibility seems remote and unlikely.102 
Second, the semantic content of the clause that specifies that the 
Chief Justice shall preside in the trial of the President does not either 
state or imply that the Vice President shall preside in all other cases.  It is 
obvious that the clause does not state that the Vice President will preside 
in impeachment trials of persons other than the President—those words 
or their equivalent simply do not appear in Section Three of Article One.  
                                                                                                                                      
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 102. An investigation of the relevant linguistic facts is outside the scope of this essay.  A prelimi-
nary investigation suggests that one of the meanings of “President” is “an appointed or elected head of 
any gathering, who presides over meetings and proceedings.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY presi-
dent, n.2.  If “President” is used in this sense, then “presiding” is clearly one of the Vice President’s 
functions in his role as “President” of the Senate.  But this does not settle the matter, as the Vice Pres-
ident would have this role even if there were a rule that qualified the role in the case of his own trial.  
If such a rule existed, it would surely not entail that the Vice President was no longer the “President” 
of the Senate, and that fact demonstrates that the semantic content of “President” does not entail the 
conclusion that the Vice President must preside in all conceivable circumstances.  The Constitution 
itself allows for the selection of a President pro tempore, but does not specify the role. U.S. CONST. 
art. I., § 3.  Moreover, Amar’s hypothetical situation has never come to pass in the actual world. 
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It should also be obvious that the clause assigning the presiding role at 
trials of the President does not create an implication to that effect.  We 
need to be careful here.  I am using the word “implication” in a stipulat-
ed sense—logical implication or entailment.  In that sense, there is simply 
no argument that Section Three (as it stands) logically implies that the 
Vice President shall preside at his own trial.  This can be demonstrated 
by imagining that Article III stated, “When the Vice President of the 
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.”  The amended ver-
sion would not contain a logical contradiction, and hence the version 
without the amended version does not entail that the Vice President shall 
preside at his own trial.  If this result seems counterintuitive to you, this 
is likely because you recognize some form of contextual enrichment 
(such as an implicature) to the effect that the Vice President shall preside 
in all other cases.  We shall turn to contextual enrichment in due course.  
At this stage, we are considering only the semantic content of Section 
Three and the logical implications of that content. 
Third, Section Five of Article One confers upon the Senate the 
power to make its own rules.  If the Senate made a rule that provided 
that someone other than the Vice President should preside if the Vice 
President is tried upon impeachment, that would be a rule of the Senate.  
We have already seen that this rule would not violate the semantic con-
tent of Section Three nor any rule logically entailed by the semantic con-
tent. 
Our conclusion so far is that neither the semantic content of Article 
Three nor its logical implications compel the conclusion that the Vice 
President is constitutionally entitled to preside at his own impeachment 
trial.  It might be argued, however, that this conclusion is required by the 
full communicative content of Article Three after contextual enrichment.  
The argument would be that although the rights and powers of the Presi-
dent of the Senate are not specified, the text in context suggests this im-
plicitly or through an implicature.  The President of the Senate must play 
some role, and because the Senate is a legislative body, the obvious role 
is that of presiding officer.  This implicit assumption might be confirmed 
by the assignment of the role of presiding officer to the Chief Justice in 
cases of trial—the assumption being that the Vice President would be bi-
ased in such a case (because the Vice President would succeed the Presi-
dent if he were removed from office).  Moreover, Section Three explicit-
ly recognizes the office of President Pro Tempore, who serves as 
President of the Senate in the absence of the Vice President.  Doesn’t 
this specification assume that the role of the Vice President is necessary 
to the functioning of the Senate because otherwise, this provision would 
be unnecessary? 
There is something to these arguments from contextual enrichment, 
but they do not establish the necessary conclusion—that the written Con-
stitution confers a right on the Vice President to serve at his own trial for 
impeachment.  Precisely because implicit assumptions and implicatures 
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are unstated, their content is frequently underdetermined by the publicly 
available context of constitutional communication.  Suppose that contex-
tual enrichment is sufficient to yield the conclusion that the Vice Presi-
dent ordinarily serves as presiding officer of the Senate—as seems likely.  
It is not so clear that it also yields the more particular conclusion that the 
Vice President is entitled to serve as presiding officer in his own trial.  
Implicit assumptions and implicatures do not work like logical implica-
tions—they are frequently underdeterminate and contestable.  For this 
reason, that portion of the communicative content of the Constitution 
provided by contextual enrichment is frequently vague or irreducibly 
ambiguous. 
Although much more could be said, this seems to be the case with 
respect to the Vice President’s right to preside in his own trial.  The 
communicative content of constitutional text underdetermines the ques-
tion, opening a construction zone.  In this case, the work of constitutional 
construction would be done by the Senate itself pursuant to its Section 
Five power to determine its own rules of proceeding.  Were the Senate to 
adopt a rule providing that the President Pro Tempore should preside in 
the case of an impeachment trial of the Vice President, that rule would 
reflect a reasonable construction of Section Three. 
In the end, the question whether the Vice President may preside at 
his own trial upon impeachment can be answered plausibly by original-
ists.  This is a case where the text actually says less than a surface inspec-
tion reveals.  Once we understand the distinction between semantic con-
tent and communicative enrichment, the appearance that the 
Constitution gives the Vice President the right to be judge in his own 
case dissolves.  The Senate’s power to adopt rules governing its proceed-
ings would seem to encompass the power to adopt a rule governing the 
remote possibility that a Vice President would attempt to preside in his 
own impeachment; such a rule would clearly be within the power of 
“[e]ach House” to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” 
VI. CONCLUSION: OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
From an originalist perspective, we have a written constitution.  
When we engage in constitutional interpretation, the communicative 
content of the written Constitution is the target of our investigation.  The 
meaning of the written Constitution, however, is not limited to the se-
mantic content of the words and phrases.  The full communicative con-
tent of the Constitution is a function of text and context—and hence of 
inferences and implicatures that necessarily involve extratextual sources.  
When we engage in constitutional construction, originalism endorses a 
principle of constraint: our constitutional constructions must reflect the 
communicative content of the text and may not contradict that content.  
But when the communicative content of the constitutional text underde-
termines the content of constitutional doctrine, we are in the construc-
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tion zone.  In that zone, extratextual sources necessarily play a role.  
Sometimes the meaning of the text runs out before we know what to do. 
From an originalist perspective, constitutional interpretation and 
construction necessarily involve extratextual sources, but only when they 
are deployed in a way that is consistent with fidelity to the original public 
meaning of the U.S. Constitution.  We have a written Constitution; we 
have constitutional law given shape and content by sources other than 
the constitutional text. 
